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SOVIET COLUMNS REPORTED BOGGED DOWN IN PROVINCES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 16 Sep 80 pp 6-7

/Article by Frederic Smelt: "We Are Driving Amid the Debris of Soviet Convoys for 30 Kilometers"/

/Text/ It is one of the oddities of the Soviet Union's war with Afghanistan that, in August 1980, a tourist may obtain at least a transit visa by which to enter or leave the country at the traditional border points: Islam-Qala with Iran and Spinboldak and Torkham with Pakistan.

We can only speculate about the reasons. Perhaps the intention is to maintain the illusion that there is no war in Afghanistan; possibly the Soviet Union does not mind if, in addition to Afghans, a handful of foreigners witness the destruction of the country, especially because foreigners rarely get to the bombed villages far off the main roads. In any case the Soviets cannot block the major overland routes, because there is only one road in each direction of the compass.

Whatever the reason: Anyone nowadays crossing Afghanistan from West to East must breathe a sigh of relief upon arrival in Pakistan--despite the heat of the monsoon--, and although even there the traveler is still pursued by the tragedy of the country. In the two Pakistani border provinces--North West-Frontier Province and Baluchestan--the white tented camps of Afghan refugees stretch for many kilometers. The government of the host country has officially announced that just about a million Afghans have been registered as refugees, and that every day approximately 40,000 more are asking for asylum. No longer to be traced in Afghanistan are the people whom I had intended to visit there. Villages I used to be familiar with are no more than a collection of deserted mud ruins.

The first large city reached from Iran is Herat which, in the past 2 years, was the stage of repeated rebellions against the communist government in Kabul and the Soviet experts and soldiers--all equally disliked. Life is normal on the surface, at least in the daytime; by night shots ring out. One side uses machine guns, the other replies with some scattered rifle shots. As a rule a tank finally restores the nightly calm.

There is little obvious destruction. The famous Friday Mosque of the Timurid era glitters intact in the morning sun. It is untouched just like the long pine bordered avenue which stretches to the city limit where a small convoy is collecting. Drivers here are not ordered to join convoys, but in view of the general insecurity nearly all of them seek the protection of the herd. The foreigners are put in the middle; if the road were wide enough, outriders would ring them on all sides, so that the guests should not be harmed. Considering the Afghans' hospitality and concern we feel ashamed to be citizens of European nations who are mere spectators of the Soviet invasion of this country. Just once is an Austrian asked why his country had sent an Olympic team to Moscow. However, he is quickly saved from having to answer by the reminder that, after all, it is not his fault.

Initially nothing indicates any danger; even the Russian armored car personnel, busy with their morning ablutions, seem deceptively peaceful. Some 50 kilometers on mujaheddins stop our small column. Once informed of their nationalities, they totally disregard the foreigners. The Afghan drivers are made to show their identity papers and say why they are on the road. At this point nobody asks them to recite the Islamic creed. Usually this is one of the more touching than effective criteria for the Islamic fighters: After all, as a rule even communist officials are quite familiar with that creed.

An old man with an imposing gray beard, obviously the leader of the group, observes our departure without moving a muscle. His outline is sharply sketched against the brown of the mountains and the blue of the sky: at this moment it seems a symbol of Afghan resistance. Still retaining this image we meet a Soviet tank unit; its soldiers are not watching the road and thus missed the mujaheddin. That also, we are told, is far from rare.

Getting near Kandahar we hear artillery fire. After walking a while, we spy a small oasis surrounded by tanks. The muffled impact of the cannon fire is answered by only the odd rifle shot. Nobody can explain why the tanks do not simply occupy the village.

We must proceed to Kandahar where, in 1747, Ahmad Shah Durani was crowned the first king of Afghanistan. His empire stretched well beyond the modern borders of the country.

Our saunter through the local bazaar begins with a somewhat spectral scene: On the central square of the new city, the Chahidanu-Chawk, looms a monument to those killed in action at Maiwand where an English unit was defeated in 1880, the time of the second Anglo-Afghan war which was also a civil war. Now a heavy-set man, dressed in wide breeches and loose shirt, sits under the small azure canopy and, rifle in hand, guards that which he evidently considers public order in Kandahar. His militia, though not wearing any uniforms, randomly stop men who return from shopping via the square and frisk them for weapons. Often the faces of these guardians of public order

are covered up to the eyes by kerchiefs. Are they protecting themselves from the dense dust--or do they want to remain incognito?

Obviously the whole procedure is designed only to humiliate the men of Kandahar, because weapons are hard to find by this method. Everyone carrying arms knows what is going to happen and only has to turn off into a small street in the bazaar. Neither the regular nor the military police set foot in that tangle. One of the spectators murmurs in English: "What do you think of these achievements?" We silently communicate by eye contact. Nothing else is possible because just at that moment three tanks clatter through the throng of people. All hatches are closed: Soviet soldiers here do not ride on top of their armored vehicles as they do in Kabul.

In a restaurant we are served a meal covered in dust because the square has been so churned up by the tanks that no more than tiny fragments of asphalt remain. The emaciated waiter who is certainly more likely to have led the life of a slave than that of a lord, explains why, in his opinion, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan: "They want our country. They want our fruit. Here in Kandahar they can easily buy grapes, pomegranates, water melons, rice, meat, bread--simply everything."

A young man compelled to study in Moscow had assured him that nothing like this is available in Moscow. Besides, he had with his own eyes seen the rations supplied to the Soviet forces.

According to him the average rations doled out to the occupying forces consist largely of cans containing indefinable fish and meat. Morsels of meat swim in yellow fat. The consumption of Soviet black bread presumes an excellent set of teeth.

His description may or may not be accurate. It is interesting, though, that this contempt for the Soviets is pervasive, though the occupying forces daily demonstrate their technical superiority to the Afghans: For one this is a means for revenging oneself on the oppressors without incurring any danger, secondly the Soviets are considered wicked heathens, and lastly the Afghans display surprising self-confidence, especially in rural areas.

At dusk Kandahar is transformed into what appears to be a deserted city. Temporarily in abeyance seems to be the custom of spending the cool of the evening in a teahouse. Sleep does not come easily in these Kandahar nights: we are awakened twice by the rattle of tanks moving out of the city, once by a brief and distant exchange of shots. Unfortunately these military interludes also arouse all the dogs in Kandahar, and they do not leave the city. The road from Herat to Kandahar was originally constructed with Soviet aid; after Kandahar begins the American road section. Long gone are the times when the two superpowers peacefully competed by way of development projects, and Afghanistan benefited from their rivalry. Hindsight allows us to note that in those years also the Soviet Union proceeded in

accordance with a definite plan, and that the United States assigned the country to the Soviet sphere of influence. This serves in part to explain its present-day indifference and helplessness.

From Kandahar a good asphalt road runs to the 25 km distant airport and, beyond it, to the Pakistan border. The Americans built the unduly large airport as a counter to Kabul Airport, constructed with Soviet aid. However, it soon emerged that, as a result of massive miscalculations, they had erected a "cathedral in the desert." At present the Soviets derive a great deal of benefit from the American experts mistake, because this airport is their most important strategic stronghold in southern Afghanistan, defended by a ring of camouflaged tanks. Anyone approaching this fortress too closely soon hears a rustling somewhere, and a shirtless soldier topped by a sun helmet looks at him in some astonishment.

Road checks are left to Afghan soldiers. These display much talent for improvisation and have constructed a kind of tank from the damaged rods of the destroyed toll booths. We are made to stop and make way for the Soviet convoy from Kabul. Surrounded by protective tanks, 87 supply trucks turn off to the stronghold. At the time we thought that the drivers looked relieved upon reaching their goal; later on burnt-out Russian vehicles on the road provided an explanation of that relief. About half the vehicles carry motor fuel, others coke, food, weapons and people. Occasionally a boyish face peeps from the slits in the armored personnel carriers. Contrary to some Western reports the Soviets still seem to send mostly recruits to Afghanistan, or at least it appears so from our observations on the road. What may be their thoughts when they never meet a foreign class enemy, such as in January last Soviet soldiers obviously expected to see in Afghanistan?

Close to the airport we notice the ruin of a yellow house and several shot up mud huts. They are evidence that the mujaheddin have launched some minor attacks on this Russian fortress, albeit in vain. Five kilometers further on the sovereign territory of the mujaheddin begins again. In the wide semi-desert valley stretching for 120 km to the Pakistani Kundal Pass we encounter two small vaulted mud buildings at the edge of the road: They are still inhabited, though some buildings in the village further inland are destroyed. We ask for information how to behave and are told: The entire area is controlled by the mujaheddin. No representatives of the Afghan Army or the Afghan Government are to be med until Spinboldak, the Afghan border city. The mujaheddin are unlikely to stop us. We are told that foreign vehicles (here signifying largely Pakistani vehicles) are left alone.

We are driving through a sparsely inhabited desert valley. On the horizon ragged mountain tops loom, mauve colored and surrounded by dust devils which look like Aladdin's genie, escaped from the bottle. Ruined bazaar streets indicate that once upon a time the area was livelier. Finally a small mud settlement and three trees emerge, and screeching brakes remind

us that, in the summer of 1980, it is advisable to look at the road ahead, even though there is no traffic: We come to a stop just before a deep hole in the road, caused by a mine set to destroy a bridge. Evidently the explosion did not make the bridge collapse. Later we see many half-destroyed bridges which bear mute witness to the resolution as well as to the technical problems of Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation forces.

The small border city Spinboldak slumbers peacefully in the sun. Except for some Afghan soldiers at ease in front of the public buildings nothing reminds us of war. A few kilometers further on is the waterless border post. In the old days there used not to be any formalities, because Pashtuns live on both sides of the border. Now Afghan soldiers in sun bleached uniforms search every package, frisk every young man for weapons and hand their commander any fragment of paper with writing on it because they are of course illiterate. The commander, correct but obviously discontented, does his duty. Two ancient and bent nomad crones, intending as usual to walk straight past the guard post, are sharply whistled back. Despite their shrill complaints their bundles of herbs are thrown in the dust; then they are graciously permitted to limp on because, despite the almost unbelievable (for Afghanistan) punctiliousness of the border checks, the soldiers would of course not dream of touching the women. Although the latter are unlikely to do so, they could actually carry all kinds of information underneath their voluminous torn skirts. However, this is a useless speculation because the mujaheddin and others are able effortlessly to pass across the mountains which are not guarded by Afghanistan.

The driver of a melon truck is made to feel the sovereign Afghan ire. He had apparently forgotten to bring one of the required papers. The other documents are therefore thrown at him--and that is how something is done for the education of the people. Later the melons are allowed to proceed to Pakistan. True, something may be hidden underneath them, but it would be impossible for the staff of the border post (possibly 10 men) to inspect every truck after making it unload.

As we do not have an exit visa, we must return to Kandahar where, in the course of an evening, we are told about the recent battles fought in the province. It is impossible to ascertain how many villages have been destroyed and residents killed; the reports diverge far too much, and too many are second or even third hand. Moreover, all of us have repeatedly visited Afghanistan in the past and are fairly familiar with the Afghan's cavalier treatment of figures. Still, none of these reservations can change the fact that the Russian invasion forces use tanks, helicopters and strafing jet fighters to destroy Afghan villages if they believe that the villages harbor mujaheddin. And yet, as a rule, the latter have left the village by that time, and the attack hits only the civilian population. Although some of the local people can take to the mountains and later flee to Pakistan or the larger cities, the sick, the aged and children who cannot run quickly, are often killed or maimed.

The authorities allow travelers freely to leave Kandahar. The convoy, this time compulsory, collects about 13 km further on in a village bazaar. During their long wait the travelers refresh themselves with tea, cookies and fruit. At last all vehicles, people, sheep and freight have been checked, and the roughly 50 vehicles of today's convoy to Kabul are allowed to leave for the mountains in small groups.

No Soviet forces are visible for the next 300 km (or thereabouts). We drive across the steppe, brown and arid in the summer heat, across ochre colored hills where the grazing camels can barely be distinguished from their surroundings, across rugged mountain ranges sometimes gleaming blue with lavender colored thorn bushes, through steppe valleys relieved from time to time by small oases--their trees and fields gleaming like emeralds in the sunlight.

Only four burnt-out Russian tanker trucks, damaged bridges, holes in the road and frequent tank tracks remind us that Afghanistan is at war. The vehicles must have been destroyed quite recently because such remains are quickly scavenged and recycled: Twice we meet trucks carrying away wrecks. If the vehicles are not badly damaged, they are immediately used again. Our convoy includes a windowless bus, artfully hammered back into its original shape. Admittedly, no friendly or curious faces look out of the window frames; instead the bus carries bewildered sheep and goat, soothingly talked to by their herdsmen.

In larger villages we do see ruined schools and other public buildings. This tactic of the Islamic liberation fighters does not really manifest Islamic hostility to education. Their chief purpose is to bring public life to a stop as long as the Soviet Union tries to dominate the country with the aid of a puppet government.

In former times the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan knew some real social commitment, not only the personal power calculation which suggested that the key to Kabul could be turned only with Soviet aid. Now this commitment has decayed into miserable propaganda. The most vehement critique comes from former party members who are horrified to see their dream of having physicians, teachers, farm experts and better qualified officials sent to the villages turn into the nightmare of Soviet occupation forces.

Afghan soldiers are rarely in evidence. Less of them than a year ago appear to be stationed in the garrisons of Kalat-i-Ghilzai and Mukur, the two largest provincial cities between Kandahar and Ghazni. The situation is similar in some of the "desert barracks." Armed forces personnel confirm this observation; many recruits do not return from leave. Formerly entire valleys were searched for deserters. Now in most cases the necessary personnel is lacking.

The members of the caravan slowly assemble in Mukur. From here to Ghazni we are compelled to proceed with one armored car ahead and another one

bringing up the rear. Of course, in case of an attack they would not be able to prevent a car being fired on; the terrain from now on is much too mountainous and dangerous. To approach Afghan road checkpoints these days makes for some tension. We are never quite sure which may just be passed through, and which must be respected: At times the soldiers stationed there seem to make up their minds at the last moment whether to adopt the one or the other attitude. The procedure is similar at the toll gates, because the barriers are often in ruins or the post unoccupied for other reasons.

We are moving across the mountainous steppe. Often herds and herdsmen slumber together in the valleys, and not even the watchdog has enough energy left to bark at and chase the cars. In the black tents woven from goat hair, erected usually at some distance of one another, work has come to a stop. Occasionally colorfully dressed and unkempt nomad children stand around in the thorny steppe. Only the camels are unfazed by the heat. They munch on the thorn bushes or gracefully weave through the herd, seemingly melting into the landscape.

Near Ghazni the destruction is once again more visible. Some buildings show signs that military force, not the wind or father time have caused their walls to fall. Sometimes the ruins are smoke blackened. The destruction in Ghazni itself is less than we imagined after reading the newspaper reports. Deserted and in some cases hit by rockets, the 10 buildings of the lower barracks line the outer edge of the city. Close by Russian forces are encamped. At the gas station, where gasoline is available for the first time for hundreds of kilometers, everybody talks of the helicopter attacks on the Ghazni barracks. Ten-year old boys volunteer the information that they will expel the Soviets as soon as they get a bit older. Though Afghan guards do not join the boys chant of "death to the Russians," they look on benevolently. Other men silently indicate the Soviet military vehicles which are only 300 meters away.

We are at liberty to drive into Ghazni, but a policeman tells us that we should hurry if we want to go on to Kabul, because the road is controlled by the mujaheddin from 17.00 hours on. A moment later he seems to remember his official function and uses the official term "opponents, enemies." The road is totally unguarded, the bridge unprotected though it bears traces of bomb attacks and some of the telephone wires are cut. Only one explanation is possible: The Afghan Army survives only in tattered remnants, while the Soviets do not yet have enough personnel in Afghanistan to patrol the roads.

With the exception of the northern roads which carry their reinforcements, the Russians do not control any roads in Afghanistan outside the cities. Evidently they are reluctant to deploy the enormous manpower necessary to do this, especially because they are able in an emergency quickly to build a pontoon bridge or drive in the riverbeds which carry no water in summer. Moreover the mujaheddin's technical potential is still quite negligible. The numerous attempts to blow up the bridges show that the Soviet reinforcement routes are in no serious danger.

Just after passing across a burnt-out Russian tanker truck we meet a Russian supply convoy of 37 vehicles. We get a demonstration of the soldiers awareness of moving in a hostile country: Two vehicles have broken down. Immediately a tank rolls up, and men armed with machine guns surround the crippled trucks.

The Kabul Valley begins with fertile villages; the harvest has been brought in everywhere. At the city limits Kabul receives us with a display of military might leading us to assume that a small attack force has collected behind us. The gun barrels of five tanks are aimed threateningly at the road, and a substantial force of police and soldiers begins to search the convoy vehicles. All that follows us, though, is the wrecked bus with the sheep and goats as well as a truck carrying sanitary appliances. Some time later we pass through the checkpoint where we are surprised to see female police. We have the oppressive feeling of entering an occupied city. However, we soon forget that, because the visible population of Kabul seems to be busy shopping, and only two open trucks carrying Soviet soldiers and two stationary armored personnel carriers remind us of the real rulers of the city.

A few days later we leave Kabul for Pakistan. Once the Kabul police and armed forces checks are past, the Afghan security authorities concern themselves with the travelers at only a few locations, probably because not many people still pass across parts of the country. Most provincial officials indeed hope to survive the civil war and the Soviet invasion by keeping strictly to their offices. They certainly have no intention of leaving them for any kind of official operation.

The road from Kabul to Jalalabad and Pakistan runs via breathtaking canyons, the Tangi-Ghard, through which the Kabul River, joined later by the Panshir River, wends its way. Water power is used by three major hydroelectric plants: Mahipar, Naghlu and Sarobi. In August last they were fortified so as to become small fortresses. Every building has at least one protective tank to itself, the more important ones are ringed by armor. All central switching plants are guarded by Soviet forces, Afghan units are confined to ancillary buildings. Buildings close to the road are also surrounded by sandbag barriers to protect them against mujaheddin attacks.

The road crosses hilly terrain; the rather low ranges sometimes approach the road, at other times the Kabul Valley opens out. Of course it would be more accurate to write "the remnants of the road," because some 50 km off Jalalabad it becomes a battleground. One bridge after the other is half blown up, and the railings look bizarre suspended in the air. Entire road sections are devastated by mines and other explosives and, like the bridges, can be traversed only with an effort; often we pass only a fraction of an inch by a bomb crater. Also often we think that we will directly land in a waterless riverbed, next to a wrecked car already down there. Occasionally we have to avoid some tank chains which snake in the dust, occasionally a wrecked truck--but most trucks have been pushed off the road into the abyss.

The mujaheddin employ two kinds of tactics. Either they fasten a mine to a bridge, and when a Russian convoy vehicle triggers it, other vehicles tend to pile up and are damaged also. Or they shoot out the tires of a truck before the truck itself is burnt. This tactic also tends to result in the destruction of several vehicles because the trucks following in the convoy are unable quickly enough to take evasive action. Oddly enough the Soviet forces are not changing their driving habits: On the contrary, the more dangerous the roads become for them, the more closely their vehicles stick together. In any case we normally see four wrecked trucks at the places of ambush.

We drive through this pile of wrecks for nearly 30 km. Most of them are ruined supply trucks which have shed their loads all about them. However, we also come across two tanks and the remains of four armored personnel carriers, though these are removed most rapidly because it has become almost routine for Russian convoys to have two gun carriages bring up the rear. Whenever the trucks were laden with glass food containers, a pile of glass covers the entire vicinity. Most of the wrecks belong to Soviet convoys, but Afghan civilian vehicles are sometimes involved also. The last attack must have happened in the early morning hours: The trucks were still smoking and the tires, though torn, still spun madly. Nowhere along this section did we meet either police nor military personnel. The mujaheddin also hid from curious eyes.

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CSO: 4401

IMPACT OF IRAN-IRAQ WAR ON WESTERN INDUSTRY

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 20 Sep 80 pp 8, 9, 10

[Text] In a report on the gravity of clashes between Iran and Iraq, FINANCIAL TIMES military analyst writes that Iran-Iraq war is, undoubtedly, more dangerous for Western industries than most other border clashes in the Middle East.

Both countries are among the major oil producers and both are located right in the center of an oil region and navigation route.

Saddam Hussayn's unilateral decision last Tuesday to abrogate the 1975 treaty with Iran regarding Shatt-al Arab had been interpreted as a "declaration of war" by Tehran government.

Even though the timing of the announcement took diplomats by surprise, it is believed that the move is part of the long-term policy of Saddam Hussayn, aimed at making Iraq a new power in the Arab World and replacing Iran as the dominant force in the Persian Gulf.

The vacuum created by the signing of peace agreement with Israel by Anwar Sadat, and his hostility towards the Iranian Revolutionary regime, have speeded up the events.

The Ba'thist regime of Saddam Hussayn is made up, mostly, of Sunni moslems. Therefore any attempt by Iran at exporting its Shi'ite revolution, which make 50 percent of population in Iraq, is of great concern to the regime.

At the same time, Saddam Hussayn, who came to power only 14 months ago, is trying to build up a prestige for himself. Even though he had been the "strong man" of Iraq in the past 7 years, his action regarding the Shatt-al Arab removes the stain from that country's pride.

Shatt-al Arab, the confluence of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, flowing into the Persian Gulf, is Iraq's only waterway. On the one side of this 180-kilometer-long waterway, Iraq's main port of Basra is located. On the other side is Abadan, the site of Iran's largest refinery. Oil pipelines of both countries are at the mouth of the waterway.

Abadan refinery, with 600,000 barrels a day capacity, is the most vulnerable. It is located at the mouth of the waterway which is only few hundred meters wide.

Tankers do not call directly at the refinery. Its terminal is at Bandar Mahshahr, some 35 kilometers east of Abadan. Kharg Island, which is the loading terminal for Iran's unrefined oil, is even farther from Iraq.

Khorramshahr is still one of Iran's main ports, handling a major portion of the nation's cargo. It is, at the same time, a naval base for small fast missile boats and other small coastal defense gun-boats.

Ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which controlled both banks of the Shatt-al Arab, the dispute over the waterway has been going on continuously. Most of the time Iraq had the control of the estuary, but in 1975, during the OPEC summit conference in Algiers, Iraq was forced to come to terms with the Shah.

Under the agreement, the Shah withdrew its support from the rebellious Kurds who were fighting Iraq for their independence. In return, the midline of the waterway became the border between the two countries. As a result, the costly war with the Kurds came to an end but at the expense of Iraq's national pride. Iraq now intends to regain that from a weakened Iran.

Weakened

Iraqi officials obviously hope that Iran, because of having been weakened, will not become engaged in a full war with Iraq. Iraqi forces last week advanced at least 16 kilometers in some areas in Iran and it seems that all efforts to push them back have failed.

Build up of the Iraqi armed forces through the purchase of the latest arms and equipment from the Soviet Union and western Europe coincided with the weakening of the Iranian military which was equipped with American-made arms and equipment. Military experts believe that Iraq could confidently expect to win air and ground battles but could not be so sure in the war at seas because Iranian navy was very little affected by the revolution.

Should Iran try to challenge Iraq in the Persian Gulf by interferring in its shipping, the dispute, as far as the West is concerned, will take a serious turn. At the same time, the Soviet Union, because of the strategic importance of the Gulf and the fact that it is enjoying port facilities at the mouth of the estuary in Iraq, is closely watching the situation.

Meanwhile, Saddam Husayn has involved himself in a very big gamble, for if Iran is able to limit its oil exports through military operations he must turn to the pipelines carrying Iraqi oil through Turkey and Syria.

During a short period of time last year, because of normal relations with Syria, this pipeline was put to use again but the projected plans for unity did not materialize and the relations between the countries deterriorated to the point that any moment the pipelines could be shut off once again.

Saddam Husayn must also think of the effect of the dispute on the OPEC summit meeting that is to be held in Baghdad next month, and also the role he will have to play as the host of the conference of the non-aligned heads of states in 1982 through which he hopes to improve his world image.

At this time, it is as difficult to guess the reason for Saddam Husayn's decision to intensify the dispute with Iran, as it is to foresee the reaction of the very unstable Iranian officials. The situation should be a great cause for concern both for the 2 superpowers and the oil consumers in the world.

Another important factor to be born in mind in any hightening of the crisis is the attitude and behavior of the Arabic-speaking majority in Khuzestan who is dissatisfied with the Persian-speaking people who was attracted to the province by the oil industry.

Bitterness

Ever since the start of the Iranian revolution, Iraq has tried to increase the awareness of this Arabic-specking group. Arab separatists, who had been trained in Iraq, were responsible for the explosion last February of the oil pipelines. Even though these activities did not prove to be an obstacle to crude oil production, they were sources of continued headaches and concern.

In the meantime, bitterness between Iran and Iraq was in evidence last week during the OPEC meeting in Vienna, which was the reason for the extension [sic] of the summit conference that is to be held in Baghdad next month.

Iran was recognized to be the biggest obstacle in reaching agreement on long-term production policy and the pricing of oil. And it [sic] declared that OPEC and Iraq were the culprits that constantly raised the production.

Iranian nervousness had been intensified by closer ties between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The disagreement in the OPEC [conference] in the election of its chairman was a sign of that. Iraq's representative was able to block Iran's delegation from the chairmanship and make the conference elect Algerian representative as chairman. (NAME-YE RUZ: Reports from Vienna said the opposite had been true.)

A Comparison Between the Two Partie's Military Power

Iran: Army, 120,000 to 150,000. Tanks, 1100.* Artillery, 800 pieces. Aircraft, 447.* Navy 20,000.

Iraq: Army, between 120,000 to 200,000. Tanks, 2100. Aircrafts, 350. Artillery, 1,800 pieces. Navy, 4,000.

(*Facing shortage of spare parts).

9561
CSO: 4906

PILOTLESS FIGHTER-BOMBER PROPOSED

Tel Aviv MA'ARAKHOT in Hebrew May/Jun 80 pp 13-15

[Article by Capt (Res.) Dr Azriel Lorber: "Pilotless Combat Aircraft - Pseudoscience or Reality of the 90's?"]

[Text] Whenever the subject of "the future combat aircraft of the air force" comes up, there is a penetrating debate focusing repeatedly on the question: Should the State of Israel produce this aircraft itself or procure it? However, aviation and electronic sciences have advanced significantly through the years, and it seems that the time has come to concentrate on questions of a completely different type: Is it necessary at all to develop or to purchase a new manned combat aircraft, or perhaps it is desirable and worthwhile to think of a pilotless aircraft with a reasonable performance level and at a reasonable cost which would fulfill most of the functions of a fighter-bomber. Is it possible to develop such a pilotless aircraft and produce it within the next 5 to 10 years?

Consideration of the subject of the pilotless combat aircraft first requires a response to two main questions:

Is the pilotless combat aircraft possible with the current technology, or perhaps the technology is still not ready for this?

Is the pilotless combat aircraft -- or beyond this, an air force based significantly (a minimum of 30-50 percent) on pilotless combat aircraft -- a worthwhile long-range subject (and not necessarily from the financial aspect)?

Let us first consider if an effective pilotless combat aircraft is indeed feasible. In order to justify such a pilotless aircraft, the following conditions must exist:

A. Its flight performance must be identical to or surpass that of future aircraft.

B. Its ordnance-bearing capacity must be identical to or surpass that of future aircraft.

C. Its ability to deliver this ordnance to its target must be identical to or surpass that of future aircraft.

D. Its cost, including the life cycle cost, must be lower than that of future aircraft.

Let us begin with performance. The fact that it is manned means that the conventional combat aircraft has a disadvantage which limits its maximum performance. Aircraft performance does not only mean speed and fuel consumption but also maneuverability expressed in G's. Because of this, the performance of the modern combat aircraft is limited to about 6-10 G's, and even this is for extremely short periods of time and with the assistance of auxiliary instrumentation. A manned combat aircraft maneuvering regularly at 10-15 G's, not to mention 20 G's, is unthinkable.

Performance is also a function of weight. The lighter the aircraft, because of certain designs and engines, the better its maneuverability and fuel economy and the shorter the runway required for take-off and landing. In a manned aircraft there is an enormous waste of weight in terms of pure engineering. The pilot himself requires a supply of oxygen, air conditioning, and an ejection seat. In addition, it must be noted that all the information on flight and combat conditions which the aircraft produces by means of super-sophisticated instrumentation must be translated into an audio or visual form so that the pilot can absorb it with his natural senses. As a result, the equipment which provides the information adds tens of kilograms to the weight -- a factor which complicates the aircraft and increases its vulnerability to mishaps because in the air, the additional weight is known to have much more serious implications than on the ground. Every additional kilogram and cubic decimeter in flight means, therefore, an immediate increase in the aircraft, its weight, its fuel consumption, and so forth. In other words, in terms of weight considerations alone, a pilotless aircraft can be built around the same engine and its flight performance will far surpass that of a manned aircraft, its ordnance-bearing capacity will be identical, and it will only be 60-75 percent as large as a manned aircraft.

There is a claim, and apparently a not insignificant one, that a pilot in an aircraft has an advantage over every automatic system. The pilot can absorb changing information on the situation, analyze it immediately, and make the appropriate decision. These facts are essentially correct, however their interpretation is suitable for a past generation as will be explained below.

Let us present the facts in a somewhat precise form: What is the pilot's function in a modern fighter-bomber? Today he is responsible for take-off and landing, checking the instrumentation for navigating the aircraft to its target; checking the instrumentation which indicates the existence or non-existence of targets (air or ground); checking the instrumentation which will bring him close to his target; and then (and only in the case of an

attack on visible ground targets and at times in air combat) to look outside, to activate or release the ordnance and depart, ideally while absorbing information on the success of the attack. At the same time, to the extent that additional information becomes available during the course of the mission, the pilot must analyze it and change the mission or the manner of its execution as necessary. In other words, the pilot plays an active role for seconds in a framework of a mission which lasts hours.

I want to reemphasize that 90-95 percent of the pilot's time is spent in checking various instruments. Moreover, in that the information which they are providing varies and changes (continuously to some extent), the pilot is unable to absorb it and analyze it rapidly or even continuously. He actually acts on a sampling of the information, aided by whistles and colored lights which signal the approach of critical limits in the most important ranges while even this information, as was stated, must be translated for the pilot on very large A scopes and dials. When there are sufficient sensors in the aircraft, then in the first estimate about 95-100 percent of the decisions in air-to-air combat and about 80-90 percent of the decisions in a ground attack mission can be carried out by a modern, sufficiently sophisticated computer which can be installed in a pilotless aircraft of reasonable size. If one is prepared to accept a certain amount of real-time communications with a human controller, it will enable one to overcome the excessive uncertainty involved in the implementation of these missions. It is only proper to note at this point that even in manned aircraft today there is a significant degree of ground control over fighter bombers, mainly because of the heavy but extremely effective instrumentation (radars and computers) possible on the ground. Air superiority aircraft, for example, are guided to their targets from the ground. The Russians do this more than the West as was evident from an inspection of the MIG-25 whose pilot fled to Japan. Bombers also now require an increasing degree of target indication from the ground in order for them to be able to unload their ordnance directly on the target. Although communications with the rear constitutes a potential for a peck of troubles, and theoretically a manned aircraft does not require these communications from the moment of take-off until landing, in actuality, the word "theoretical" is the determining factor. In the event of a complete blockage of such communications nets, the missions of manned aircraft will also suffer. On the other hand, under certain conditions, pilotless aircraft for air superiority can also be programmed 100 percent. At the same time, achieving a complete blockage of the entire spectrum is something which appears to be impossible today, and it is almost certain that if the technology of electronic warfare improves to this extent, the technology of counter-electronic warfare will follow suit.

Another argument occasionally raised emphasizes the importance of the pilot as one who can overcome technical problems in flight. Although the pilot can press buttons and switch communications channels or something similar, in contrast, unlike in a space vehicle, he cannot crawl outside with an electric soldering iron and a wrench and attempt to fix an overheated

engine or a stuck landing gear. If the problem is serious, the pilot can only hope for the best and try to return safely to his base. Although the pilot can continue on his mission if the navigation system fails, on the other hand, the number of systems required by the very presence of the pilot has increased significantly. There is a basic rule in reliability that an increase in the number of subsystems decreases the overall reliability of the system. In other words, "removing" the pilot along with the specific auxiliary systems for a manned aircraft is likely to increase the overall reliability of the pilotless aircraft and decrease the need for correcting problems.

We have assumed so far that the performance of the pilotless aircraft would equal that of regular aircraft. Let us now consider that the requisite technology for this purpose does indeed exist. Let us see if the state of the art of all the systems is such that it is possible to develop and build a pilotless combat aircraft armed for operational missions in a high intensity battlefield and which would be a substitute to a significant degree for manned combat aircraft. It should be remembered that advanced reconnaissance pilotless aircraft which fly thousands of kilometers are a routine matter today, and we are speaking actually about additional advancement, from reconnaissance to combat and not about the basic development of pilotless aircraft.

A combat aircraft is composed of the following systems: structure, including materials and aerodynamics; propulsion; control and communications, including sensors and computers; armament.

Systems and structure: The pilotless combat aircraft in its general concept can be, as was stated, a continuation of existing pilotless aircraft or manned aircraft. Although there is no aircraft today with a maneuverability as high as 10-20 G's, steps are being taken to solve these problems. The Americans, for example, have developed and are beginning to fly the HIMAT (high maneuver aircraft technology) which is a special performance pilotless aircraft. They have recently flown an unmanned scaled-down model of the F-15 in order to test certain flight characteristics. It must be assumed that until appropriate tests are arranged for such a project and a decision is made (a matter which can take years), there will be much more information on aerodynamic subjects. In terms of structure, the technology of materials, production methods, and so forth, the aircraft can be completely conventional even under conditions of the current state of the art.

Propulsion: It is possible to build a pilotless aircraft on the basis of current propulsion technology and even on the basis of existing engines. Even existing or future engines can be developed for a shorter life since statistically it is clear that in light of the pilotless combat aircraft's missions and operational conditions, it will be subject to substantial wear.

Sensors: The current technology of off-the-shelf sensors responds to all the reasonable requirements of the pilotless aircraft which, in this respect, will be equivalent to a manned aircraft. This includes radar and television systems. The latter are connected, of course, to a system of computers for analyzing data and making decisions on the spot or in the transmission of raw data directly to the rear. For purposes of communications security, a more sophisticated computer is understandably preferable, however the proper consideration for this matter must be made within the framework of an analysis of much more complex systems than is possible or desirable to be described here.

Computers: A distinction must be made between two types of computers. The first type consists of microprocessors for control of the routine functions of take-off, flying, and landing, including control of difficulties. The system found in every sophisticated electronic game is sufficient for these tasks. The second type consists of computers with a decision-making capability under combat conditions. Although these computers are more complex than the first ones, if we remember what they come to replace (in terms of weight, complexity, hazard, and so forth) and if we add to it a modest degree of communications with a rear operator, we will see that the picture is not so black. Moreover, the computer's reaction time is immeasurably faster than that of a human, and under certain conditions, the prospect of obtaining the correct response is greater precisely because of it.

Communications: This apparently is the weak link in the entire system, although not necessarily to weak. Systems for enciphering and encoding, frequency changes, and all the other methods under development for the modern battlefield in its entirety are also suitable for the pilotless aircraft. Most of this technology exists, and the problem in general is which one to select. The future saturation of the battlefield with encoded target notations permits a decrease in communications with the rear, even in an attack on ground targets or lowering it to a level of simpler data, a change which will decrease the chances of blockage.

Programming: This is actually the only factor which requires development since programming on such a scale has never been developed for such a purpose. However, once the receiving system and the computer are available, the development of the appropriate programming is only a matter of the capability of the programmers and time. No investment in equipment or even the development of new technology is required here.

Armament: Actually off-the-shelf and dependent upon the size of the pilotless aircraft. It is almost certain that it will be worthwhile even to plan the pilotless aircraft around the existing armament since this armament was initially planned for certain targets which are not likely to be changed in the near future. The only point which may require updating is in the fact that the earlier armament which was designed to be carried by a certain aircraft will now be carried by a much "hotter" aircraft.

Let us now move to the desirability of the pilotless aircraft. Desirability has two facets, one is purely economic and the other is based on less concrete factors. It is customary to examine these matters in accordance with concepts of cost effectiveness. Put more simply, in comparison to the manned aircraft, what is the cost of every kilogram of armament on the target? Let us first consider the financial factors. Will the cost of the pilotless aircraft, including the life cycle cost, be lower than that of future aircraft. The modern fighter-bomber today (the beginning of 1980) costs between 10 and 15 million dollars apiece at the time of purchase, that is about one-half billion pounds per aircraft, a sum which does not include operational costs. We will assume that the performance of the pilotless aircraft in which we are interested must be equivalent to or surpass that of a manned aircraft and cost less or at least not more than a manned aircraft.

The performance specification of a new weapons system stems from the operational requirement developed by the requesting service, in our case the air force. History has shown that the specification of the requirements for a new weapons system is a stumbling block which time after time has foiled the very best. Practically every item in the world weapons depots has encountered this obstacle which impedes development for many years. Evidence of the extent to which this factor at times deteriorates to the absurd can be found in the fact that an important development project was once subject to a lengthy delay because of a dispute over the color of the characters on the A scope. Here the situation is simpler. A specification of the performance requirements of the pilotless aircraft can be copied directly from the performance requirements of a counterpart conventional aircraft. For example, if we are talking about an F-18, then a pilotless aircraft with an identical or better performance than the F-18 is acceptable. It must be remembered that the proposal or intention here is not for a weapons system which will do something revolutionary or even new. It is a proposal for a modern weapons system which will do something completely routine: maintain air supremacy, assist the ground forces in achieving their objectives, and disrupt the enemy's rear. Every air force in the world has had plans for decades to carry out these missions precisely. In other words, a significant part, but one which is not sufficiently stressed, of the development cost is the result of the delays and the problems in the final specification of the system. Since the specification of the system. Since the specification depends upon the mission, and this is already specified by conventional aircraft, this component is dropped at the outset.

Let us move to the second point. Every manned aircraft today carries an enormous quantity of electronics, most of which is designed to translate various types of data for the pilot and to assist him in carrying out his tasks. The cost of this electronics today is dominant in the cost of the aircraft and can even amount to 60 percent of the cost. Although the absence of a human pilot will require greater sophistication, in contrast to the certain effort involved in fulfilling this requirement, it must be

emphasized that the data in the pilotless aircraft will be direct and simpler and in view of the absence of the pilot it will be possible to use less stringent specifications and as a result, less expensive items.

As was previously stated, many of the systems required for the pilotless combat aircraft already exist. The trick will be the proper integration of the components without introducing the human element into the system. However, the development of a modern combat aircraft is precisely the same thing, the taking of the components and their integration into one weapons system.

Although at this point we have not yet proved numerically that the pilotless aircraft will be much cheaper than a manned aircraft, it is already clear that a thorough study of the subject, dealing with the pure engineering/economic points, will indeed confirm this estimate. It must be noted that a comprehensive study of the subject will not be complete if we do not consider additional factors which, as was stated, also are determinants in the long-term calculations.

a. The large-scale introduction of pilotless aircraft into service will reduce the requirement for pilots. It is no secret that in the State of Israel high caliber manpower is a serious problem, and many elements are competing for the existing human potential. The operation of the pilotless aircraft, even by ground controllers, requires people of a certain level, however they need not necessarily excel in the special qualifications required for a pilot. The physical requirements, and in part even the psychological ones, will be reduced, and the probability of finding more qualified people will increase.

b. When it becomes evident that the pilotless aircraft system with all its components is significantly cheaper than a manned aircraft, it will be possible to procure more of them for a given sum. It is doubtful if we will henceforth be able to produce more aircraft than the Arab air forces, however it is absolutely certain that we will be able to reduce the existing gap this way. This action is in itself a significant factor because of the possibility of saturating the enemy systems.

c. The fact that the pilotless aircraft are unmanned enables them to be sent on "suicide" missions (which do not necessarily end in their loss but rather the prospects of return are slimmer). The decision to send pilotless aircraft will always be easier, and such missions can be much more successful. As a general rule, the more defended a target, the greater its importance to the enemy.

Although it is very difficult to quantify the three aforementioned factors, they are no less important than the economic question, and therefore they must be expressed in any serious study.

We have not yet touched upon the question -- "to purchase or to develop?" The answer is clear in part: since there is nothing to buy, it must be developed. On the other hand, the argument is heard: "If the pilotless aircraft is so good, why haven't the Americans developed it yet?" The response to this argument, in my opinion, is not rooted in technology. Whoever has managed to land automatic space vehicles on the moon and Mars can easily build a pilotless aircraft which will meet every operational requirement. Moreover, as was stated, the Americans are actually making their first moves in this direction. Information on this subject is publicized from time to time, and in 1972 the first serious analysis was published. I believe the problem is rooted in psychology and inertia. It is an enormous step in a completely new direction, and the Americans, like every big organization, change directions very slowly. We do not have to have such inhibitions; therefore, the argument that "the Americans also do not have a pilotless combat aircraft" should be rejected. Moreover, even the Americans make foolish mistakes. There was a similar occurrence with the Gabriel. At that time also we heard the argument that the Gabriel doesn't have a chance because the Americans do not have a similar system. Although there were development problems and failures, thanks to the stubbornness of one who was obsessed, the project came to a successful conclusion.

Another argument which maintains that "we should wait until others develop it and then copy or purchase it" acknolwedges that the technology exists and the idea is essentially a good one. A country which is struggling for its right to develop a manned aircraft for the eighties must be able to develop an effective pilotless combat aircraft, and it is worthwhile to be first. This has very many advantages.

A decision to enter the era of the "robot air force," at least in the combat segment, is undoubtedly a daring step but one with great prospects. There is no intention here to eliminate the air force. Transport aircraft, communications aircraft, helicopters, and even a significant percentage of combat aircraft will be operated even in the future by pilots. However, wherever the lead is flying and wherever it is possible with the same degree of effectivenss to introduce a conglomerate of copper wires and silicon chips instead of a human, it is the correct approach, especially in a country which claims that human life is its foremost consideration.

5830
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FUEL PRODUCTION FROM PLANTS VIEWED AS PROMISING

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV 11 Aug 80 p 18

[Article by Aharon Priel: "In the 'Garden of Energy Plants' in Bet-Dagan, They Are Growing the Fuel of the Future: 'The White Gold' of Volkney Institute As An Answer to the 'Black Gold' of the Arabs"]

[Text] Sources of oil, the fuel which presently moves the wheels of the world economy, are dwindling. All the studies indicate that by the end of the 20th century, the Eden of oil will end and be followed by a new era of the Eden of coal as a major source of energy production.

Researchers in the area of energy feel that the present crisis of energy sources is causing unjustified panic. The crisis is really a psychological matter stemming from a fear because of the lack of a source of power which is simple, and which the world industry and economy are based on, including the petrochemical industry.

This opinion is shared by Mehahem Tsur, the head of the department of plant cultivation at Volkney Center in Bet-Dagan. He says, "the total worldwide consumption of liquid oil, used to operate automobiles, represents 10 percent of the total consumption of energy in any form. An additional 10 percent serves as raw material for the petrochemical industry's production of plastic products. The rest goes to industry, to power stations, to ocean traffic, to heating and everything else.

Therefore, considering the fact that coal is likely to be one of the major sources of energy production, and, if we add the nuclear reactors and the sun as additional sources, the whole crisis appears to be a transient phenomenon without basis or justification. It is an artificial crisis being used in a powerful way for purposes of political and economic pressure.

"Today there is a simple and effective solution for fuel production which would neutralize the power of the well owners: plants. Scientists know that the liquid oil produced today is a product of the decomposition of plants. There is no simpler way than to return to the plants and to try to extract from them directly this precious fluid."

In fact, in several countries, particularly in Brazil and the U.S., the fuel is being extracted and marketed to operate automobile engines. In Brazil, all government vehicles run on alcohol derived from sugar cane. The auto industry in Germany has already produced the first model of engines powered by "ethnol," alcohol extracted from plants. In the U.S., special gas stations have already been built which sell the alcohol fuel.

Researchers at the Volkney Center in Bet-Dagan, one of the most important centers of agricultural research in the world, have demonstrated that it is possible and worthwhile, from a professional and economic point of view, to use certain plants as a source of fuel to run engines. In doing so, they have made a breakthrough on a global scale (achievement of world records).

About [illegible] years ago, a research team at Volkney Center began an unusual project: growing plants with a high potential for producing a material rich in sugars which could then be turned into fuel by means of simple industrial cultivation processes.

The researchers in the department of plant cultivation concentrated on two plants: sugar cane and the cassava plant. There is a high concentration of sugar in the stalk of the sugar cane. By means of pressing and fermentation, the "ethnol" can be extracted from the sugar. This "ethnol" is alcohol which can be mixed in a 15 percent solution with benzene to operate engines. And this can be done without changing or adapting the engine.

This sugar cane, which has been adapted to growth conditions in Israel, comes from Florida. The cassava comes from Latin America. This plant contains a very high concentration of starch--about 30 percent. The "ethnol" can be extracted from this vegetable starch by means of relatively simple industrial cultivation processes.

The problem has been--what is the economic profitability of extracting fuel from plants? The contribution of the Israeli researchers has been in their success in producing record crops of sugar cane and cassava and in making the cultivation of fuel-producing plants into a profitable economic sphere of activity.

Mr Tsur says that out of thousands of strains of sugar cane, a plant which grows in tropical regions, the Israeli researchers have isolated frost-resistant strains which can be grown in Israel. "Not only that, but we even managed to grow the Israeli sugar cane in salt water containing more than 1000 mg. of chlorine per liter of water, and even by means of irrigation with wastewater which contains the raw materials of fuel production."

The researchers have already produced sizeable amounts of alcohol from these two plants which are growing on experimental lots in the "garden of energy plants" in Volkney Center at Bet-Dagan. The first results produced a yield of about 20 tons of sugar cane per dunam [≈ 1/5 acre] (50 percent higher yield than the sugar cane crop in Brazil) with a sugar content of about 18 percent, a very high concentration of sugar. "From this crop of sugar cane, we produced

about 1200 liters of ethanol per dunam. We have also gotten record yields from [illegible] tons per dunam. From that we produced about 800 liters of ethanol per dunam."

The petrochemical industries manufacture plastic products. Plastic in all its forms and compounds is, at present, one of the most important components in world industry--whether as raw material or as a finished product. Last week, we found out that it will be possible to take care of the 10 percent of liquid oil used for the petrochemical industry by means of the semi-viscous white fluid found in abundance in the tissue of an almost beautiful plant called the "wolf's milk" plant. [A pilot study has been set up at the Volkney Center in collaboration with Nobel Prize winner Professor Melvin Calvin from the University of California at Berkeley. (Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Aug 80 p 9)]

"We have found," said Mr Tsur, "for the first time anywhere, that the white fluid found in the tissue of the wolf's milk plant is a raw material well suited for the petrochemical industry. This fluid--the white gold--is a true substitute for the black gold."

The wolf's milk plants were first adapted to growth in Israel by Menahem Tsur. Now, at the end of a series of experiments, it is clear to researchers that the "white gold" of the wolf's milk plant is an excellent raw material for the petrochemical industry.

The research being carried out at the Volkney Center on sugar cane and cassava for fuel production has received grants and support from the departments of agriculture and energy. According to Mr Tsur, members of the department for plant cultivation have begun additional studies with several plants which have a high potential for containing the raw materials for fuel production. These plants, which are presently growing on experimental lots in the "energy garden" in Bet-Dagan, include: sweet potato, sweet sorghum, and Jericho sunflowers.

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DEVICE FOR USING OCEAN WAVES FOR ENERGY PRODUCTION

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR 4 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Bezalel Rubin: "Ocean Waves for Energy Production"]

[Text] Eliahu Givati, 52 years old, head of the woodworking department in the port of Eilat, who has won several efficiency prizes for all sorts of projects and inventions, has come up with a device this time which is likely to be seen in days to come as the invention of the century.

Givati's invention, which has already been registered for an international patent, has to do with the use of ocean waves and their transformation into electrical energy.

This invention will transform the latent energy in the ocean waves into usable energy which can be collected and stored. The invention includes a float, which rises and falls with the movement of the waves, an arm attached to the float in a fixed way or by means of a vertical pole. This depends on the conditions of the waves in the place where the device is operating.

How the Device Works

The float (1) rises and falls according to the movement of the waves. The movements of the float are communicated to the arm (2) which is attached to the float in a fixed way or by means of a vertical pole, all according to the state of the waves in the place where the device is operating as was explained above.

The arm is supported in its position by means of a horizontal pole. Every movement of the float, rising and falling, causes a movement in the opposite direction in the arm. As a result of these movements of the float, the arm operates a water pump or water pumps (4) permanently connected to the arm of the float. The pump draws water from a feeding pool, forces it into a collecting pool which is at a height necessary to produce an artificial and efficient waterfall. The artificial waterfall, by means of rotary motions, is used to produce electrical energy.

The Department of Energy and other scientific forces in Israel, among them the Technion, have received the specifications of Eliahu Givati's invention, but their attitude towards it has not gone beyond polite letters, an explanation about the lack of norms for follow-up experiments, and other such excuses.

It is known that Japan is investing large sums of money to carry out experiments on the subject of using ocean waves.

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CROWN PRINCE EXPRESSES VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST, CAMP DAVID

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 13 Sep 80 pp 34-36

/Interview of Crown Prince Hasan by Hayi Khayr: "The Occupation Issue Is a Single One and Jerusalem Is at the Heart of It"/

/Excerpt from text/ It is well known that Prince Hasan, the crown prince of Jordan, has for a long time been engaged in looking after economic and development affairs in the Kingdom of Jordan. However, this of course does not mean that a man of Prince Hasan's importance and status can be remote from politics, which ultimately is part of economics, and thus there occurred this politico-economic talk with the young prince which our correspondent held in Amman.

/Question/ Israel has decided to unify western and eastern Jerusalem and consider it a united capital of Israel. At the same time, Israel continues to carry out a policy of establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories. What is your highness' opinion on these measures, and how can the Arabs prevent Israel from continuing the constant process of usurpation and aggression?

/Answer/ The issue of the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Golan, is a single one, and Jerusalem the city and the region--or what is called greater Jerusalem--constitutes the spiritual, political, economic and social heart of the Palestinian Arab identity. For that reason the policy of judaization and Israeli dominance through the introduction of more than 90,000 colonialist settlers into the West Bank is to be considered obvious proof of the importance of the incorporation step "in the Israeli sense." In addition, unilaterally imposed legislation based on the logic of force, is not receiving and never will receive the respect of the international community. The true solution will come only through a return to a comprehensive view of the results of the occupation policy in distorting the Arab features of Jerusalem and other occupied Arab territories in terms of the effect on the notion of the sovereignty and civil, administrative, and religious rights of the Arab citizen in the occupied territories. The Arabs must try by every

means to win over world opinion through objective ways, at the same time as they are working to perfect the intrinsic Arab power to ensure that rights are restored.

/Question/ The Arab atmosphere is clouded over and dominated by clouds of disputes and peripheral struggles, from the Gulf to the Atlantic. These disputes have a strong obvious effect on the unity of Arab solidarity, aside from the axes which have begun to appear in various places. What is your highness' comment on these disputes, and how can we deal with these problems, which have begun to threaten unity of ranks and speech at a time when we are in the direst need of this unity and solidarity?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that Arab disputes here and there do not just influence the unity of Arab solidarity--indeed, they are splitting up the Arab forces until they collapse economically, socially and militarily because of the fragmentation of efforts and the lack of comprehensive carefully studied scientific planning which will mogilize their powers and point them on the sound road. In addition, this fragmentation weakens the image of the Arab world abroad, affecting the way these countries deal with us in the manner they should. How it amazes me, when I feel that the Arabs have not yet realized the real dimensions of Zionist designs on our economic resources and our strategic position in the region! It is sufficient for us, Arabs and Moslems, that the Palestine cause alone is an example prompting us to unity of action, causing disputes to be forgotten, with the aim not just of regaining what has been plundered but also of putting a limit to the tyrannical Zionist onslaught which threatens all Arab peoples with designs on their natural resources.

/Question/ For many years, since the October war, Arab oil has been propounded as a strong effective weapon in the struggles for liberation. Recently new trends have begun to appear, calling for the alienation of the oil weapon, because the use of this weapon will threaten the world economy and expose it to danger. Does your highness consider it necessary to use this weapon as a means of exerting pressure to influence the positions of countries hostile to the Arab cause, be they American, western or European?

/Answer/ In the light of the conferences of Arab foreign and economics ministers which have specialized in discussing political integration based on the notion of perseverance and power, a long-term Arab strategy must be crystallized with which Arab economic resources may be used to uplift the Arab nation in a manner enabling it to impose its will and consolidate its rights in a modern civilized manner.

/Question/ Jordanian-Palestinian relations are in good state and are constantly improving, and there is permanent coordination between Jordan and the Liberation Organization. Does your highness consider that this mutual understanding will realize the hopes fixed on the future?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that the good relations between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization are one of the buttresses of the desired Arab solidarity, especially since the organization and Jordan are aware of the true state of the Arabs in the occupied territories and together are striving to establish the Arab identity under occupation. Such cooperation needs more support from Arab brethren, in order that the Arab people's desired hopes may be realized.

/Question/ Will the declaration of holy war which His Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz made yield its desired fruit and achieve its noble goals which the upright Islamic religion intended /to occur/ before the comprehensive psychological, economic, political, media and human mobilization? What are your highness' expectations on this subject?

/Answer/ I believe that Arab and Islamic consensus for the Arab and Islamic nation on the strategy of action which will lead to the liberation of the territories and the restoration of dignity is tantamount to a constant holy war which we front-line states feel by the nature of our daily contact with the challenges imposed on us and the people in the occupied territories. We all are looking forward to the Arab and Islamic summit conferences in Amman and Mecca so that these meetings may result in giving meaning and sense to joint action, in keeping with the challenges of the age in the current decade.

/Question/ There are conflicting views on the results of the American elections. Some Arab politicians believe that a victory by President Carter will help resolve the deep-rooted Palestinian question more than a victory by the other candidate Reagan would. It has been said that Carter, who cannot be a candidate a third time, in 1982, will find himself relatively free from Zionist pressures following his re-election next November. What is your highness' comment on that?

/Answer/ The American peace initiatives in the area are of necessity not affected by the policy of one party to the exclusion of another. There are interests which impose themselves on the American administration, although Zionist influence has had a well-known traditional effect and as a result has led to America's aligning itself toward Israel with moral and financial support. The interests related to the Arab world are qualitatively and quantitatively greater than this influence, although the Arab voice is not heard during election campaigns. Hopes are that such objective political initiatives as the European initiative, for example, will be effective, along with the international consensus expressed in meetings of the General Assembly at the exceptional session and the weight of European condemnation of Israel's repulsive measures, especially regarding Jerusalem. Hopes also are that all these factors will lead to early pressure on the next American administration, whatever it is, so that America may again objectively and clearly play the role of a great nation in achieving peace, without discrimination.

/Question/ They state that a change in Israeli leadership, currently represented by Menachem Begin, and the advent of another leader in his place, would reduce difficulties and eliminate the obstacles Begin is putting up to obstruct the attainment of peace in the Middle East area. What are your highness' findings on this matter?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that the current Israeli government has arrogated positions to itself which in their scope go beyond the limits of the imagination in distorting the Arab identity of the Arabs on their territory and the Islamic and Christian Arab rights to their Jerusalem. That has become clear in the last 2 years, through the designs of the World Zionist Organization to move 27,000 Israeli families--that is, close to three-quarters of a million new settlers--starting in 1983 onto occupied Arab territories, aside from the fact that there is an absolute determination to turn the Arabs into minorities on their territories as in the racist protectorates in South Africa. Until the issue of the territory which was occupied in 1967 on the West Bank, Gaza and Golan, in the traditional well-known sense of territory, becomes the issue of the hour, no Israeli government's position can change and the policy of the fait accompli will continue until there is powerful, effective pressure from the international community, in particular from the United States of America, which has viewed Israel as a first and last investment in this area, ignoring the demands of stability through an overall view of the Middle East region.

/Question/ Do you believe that the latest Israeli aggressions against the south of Lebanon are a consecration of the partition of Lebanon and revival of the settlement process?

/Answer/ I believe that these Israeli acts of aggression, in this period of time specifically, when the attention of the world and the great powers is being fragmented, may be described as a great risk to the future of peace in the world and, if they continue, will lead to an indisputable "balkanization" of the region. It saddens us to see international unanimity scoffed at by the Israelis and consequently to see the continued pain, tragedy and hardships of our Arab people in Fraternal Lebanon. It is necessary to contain these encroaching dangers through a clear, explicit Arab position.

/Question/ It is apparent and noticeable that the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty have not achieved the goals hoped for from them in bringing about peace, because these agreements contained no articles specifying an end to the occupation and the granting of their legitimate rights to determine their destiny and live on their national soil to the Palestinian people. Recently, the Venice summit declaration was issued, then followed by the agreement of the European market countries, setting forth a policy coordinated with a new European initiative as an alternative to the Camp David agreements. Do you consider that the group of European countries can play an effective role in achieving a desired

just peace? What is your highness' opinion on the visit by Mr Gaston Thorn, president of the group of European countries, to Jordan, and what are your impressions of him?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that the group of European countries can play an important, effective role in realizing peace, because the European voice is heard clearly in the nations of the world, especially by the big powers, in view of the firm bonds this group has with the various countries of the world, especially the Arab world. I also believe that the Madrid meeting will preserve the continuity of these efforts, which are aimed at reimposing the proper framework based on European consensus and calling for an end to the Israeli occupation and approval of the human right to self-determination. Approval of the human right to self-determination will be fundamental in creating a Palestinian identity on its national soil. The Venice declaration was a positive step in the right direction, but it was not enough to move the issue of peace and justice in the region forward. For this reason we welcome any other initiative aimed at ending the occupation and establishing the rights of the Palestinian people, and we hold the utmost appreciation and respect for Mr Gaston Thorn, president of the European market nations, and his visit, which was aimed at collecting facts which would help the European group adopt a practical step which would actually contribute to the efforts made to achieve a comprehensive just peaceful solution in the region.

/Question/ It is well known, inside and outside Jordan, that your highness is one of the leaders most intensely interested in problems of economic development. You were the first to plan and design to bring the 3- and 5-year development projects into being and implement them. Today, now that the 3-year plan has been completed and we are on the last stages of the 5-year plan, do you consider that these development plans have met the objectives and goals for which they were drawn up?

/Answer/ Our endeavor to create a better life for the citizen is one of the major foundations on which Jordan's mission in our modern era has been based. It is a mission which is to be considered an extension of the mission of the greater Arab revolution at the beginning of this century. From this premise, we in Jordan have realized, since the start of the second half of this century, that development, as an economic and social movement, is continuous and requires preparation and planning first of all.

Therefore it was necessary to set forth development plans. We as a developing country have been able, with our limited resources, to achieve successes in economic and social spheres. Development plans in our view are not just action programs for future years but rather are a living example and a great model of the seriousness of contributing to work, action and sacrifice, creating the habit of working constantly within specific plans.

Jordan's experience in this realm is not unique. Like other developing countries, we have gone through positive and negative stages in execution.

The financial and palpable achievement of the various plans we have authorized this decade have been good, and in some programs we have gone beyond the planned investments and projects and per capita income has risen. The fruits of the projects have been reflected on those who have contributed to them. However, the circumstances of the pressures of occupation and the responsibilities laid upon the Jordanian economy have greatly limited the positive value of the achievements. To this I might add the high prices of international commodities and the local inflation problem, which are a tax that we are living through. We are now trying to concentrate on overcoming these obstacles within the context of Arab cooperation in our coming 5-year plan.

/Question/ The conferees at the Arab economics and foreign ministers' conference are embracing the principle of setting out and preparing a just comprehensive economic plan for the Arab states, preparatory to presenting it at the next summit conference in Amman. Do you believe that setting out that kind of Arab economic plan for comprehensive development will be a means for building a giant Arab economic force which will have an international worldwide effect and influence, helping our Arab nation to solve its endemic economic issues?

/Answer/ If we go back to the previous questions and answers, you will find an answer to this question of yours between their lines, since it is natural that any coordination, cooperation or single plan among Arab brothers will have a certain result through the appearance of the economic power of the Arab nation, which will have a great effect in drawing up a new map of the Arab nation before the world, which will be the start of the flow of the tides of comprehensive union among fraternal Arab countries through the passage of the years--as is the dream of every Arab who aspires to a modern, up-to-date advanced life.

/Question/ The potassium project is one of the greatest Jordanian projects, absorbing study and research for many long years. Implementation of the project has taken many years because of a shortage of money. Could you explain the benefits of this project to us? Will its production be offered on the world market soon, and will this production have a financial and economic yield which will lighten part of Jordan's economic burdens and help its economic welfare? One should realize that some biased Israeli newspapers and books have mentioned that the project is exorbitantly expensive and that its economic feasibility is not encouraging.

/Answer/ This project represents a dream which Jordan has been trying to realize for a long period. Like any great project, it needs great financing, and its output needs time to yield fruit. In addition to that, it, like other projects in developing countries, is subject to domestic and international obstacles. Thank God, project implementation has gone beyond the two stages of study and financing, since a large part of it has been completed, and the project will provide revenues of $180 million a year on reaching maximum productive capacity in 1984-85, in addition to the social,

educational and health benefits and other services it will provide the residential town at the project site. Technical and economic project feasibility studies have proved that its net yield will not be less than 18 percent of total investments, as is stated in a World Bank report, refuting the biased claims, especially Israeli doubts which have been cast on this matter, since the project is competing with an existing Israeli one. Israeli aggression is not limited to destruction and occupation but extends to all spheres in which an Arab country might advance and flourish.

/Question/ The phosphate mining, production and processing projects are among the greatest Jordanian economic projects to be established in the thirties. The Jordanian public has attributed a great deal to the phosphate projects, in its belief that phosphate production will take the place of oil production in the oil countries; however, this hope, or dream, has not been realized. What is your highness' followup on that?

/Answer/ I would like you to permit me to state that phosphate cannot take the place of oil in any case, but may constitute an important source of revenue, especially since Jordanian phosphate is considered one of the highest quality types in the world and constitutes a good source of foreign exchange. However, the dream you mentioned has in fact been the dream of our pioneers since the thirties, to achieve integration among Arab countries, since phosphate complements oil in one of the most important profit-making industries, that of chemical fertilizers. We are not hiding secrets of the obstacles which have faced us in the ambitious expansion of productive capacity, but we are on the way to overcoming them, with God's permission.

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GROWING TERRORISM IN NATION REVIEWED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 8-14 Sep 80 pp 10, 11

/Article by Nihad al-Mashnuq: "From the al-Ta'if Conference to the Incident of the American Ambassador: the Terror of Beirut Will End When the Crisis Ends"/

/Excerpt from text/ Starting with al 'Akawi

The story began, if we wish, with the explosion that killed Tal'at al-'Akkawi in the eastern section of Beirut in January 1977. A car parked in the heart of the crowded traffic blew up, causing a number of deaths and a large number of injuries. In the same month 2 years later, an automobile was detonated electronically by a woman overseeing the street from an apartment overlooking it, killing Abu Hasan, a FATH leader, and a number of his companions. The rosary was repeated, not for the last time, with the explosion of a car in front of a movie theater and cafe in the mountain town of Rifun, killing and wounding dozens of people.

No Lebanese or non-Lebanese politican remains who has not been exposed to an explosion from a car parked along the side of the road. The head of the Lebanese Front, Camile Chamoun, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, who lost his daughter in an automobile explosion after physical indisposition prevented him from going to his office as was his daily habit. Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, saved by a few seconds from an exploding car and afflicted with light wounds. Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, saved by the speed of the car he was driving, or an error in timing the explosion of the car. An automobile blew up in the area of the Barti pharmacy in al-Ashrafiyah, where there is a large population, killing and wounding people.

A Datsun, specifically, blew up with a young man and woman inside who were on their way to the eastern section, because of a mistake in timing. Booby-trapped cars were found in the Palestinian camp area and along the road usually traveled by resistance leaders in the vicinity of the Arab University and the al-Mazra'ah Corniche. Some of these cars are detonated by a clock set at a specific time and others are detonated electronically--

that is, someone plays the role of an observer in a site looking out over a parking place and sets it off when the targeted car passes by.

An Attempt at a Solution

The solution? In the western section of Beirut, advanced equipment has arrived, which is placed in a cruising car to disclose the presence of explosives in cars parked on both sides of the street. This car has been making continuous patrols since the "custom" of setting up exploding cars came into common use. It is said that this equipment has made it possible to discover a number of booby-trapped cars before they exploded, including one filled with dozens of kilograms of explosives near the Mar Ilyas Camp.

In the eastern section, authorities have stipulated that a special tag is to be placed on parked cars giving the name and other details of their owner and the car; otherwise it will risk being confiscated after it is broken into.

The consequences of these precautionary measures have not yet appeared. Terror continues by these or other means in Lebanon. The detonation of booby-trapped cars is only one aspect of the terror in Lebanon.

Ambassadors, Embassies, Airplanes

From personalities to institutions, a simple statistic, by way of example, not exclusively, shows that all official and quasi-official Iraqi institutions have faced armed attack in the midst of the Iraqi-Iranian disputes; most recent of these was the rocket pointed at the Iraqi Rafidain Bank, which was discovered before it was set off. All Iraqi personalities in Beirut, or personalities belonging to the ruling Ba'th Party in Iraq, consider themselves prone to assassination following the assassination of Mr Musa Shu'ayb, member of the regional command of the Ba'th Party in Lebanon, and the assassination of an Iraqi employee and the wounding of his colleagues at the entrance to Unesco. Likewise, all persons active in Iranian politics, by support or affiliation, have faced or are exposed to assassination.

The body of the press has been hit in the person of its union leader, Riad Taha, Salim al-Lawzi, and others. American cultural centers and the American Embassy have been exposed to armed attack, to say nothing of the assassination of the American Ambassador, Francis Meloy, whose corpse was found in al-Ramlah al-Bayda' in the summer of 1976, and the attempt to assassinate the current American ambassador, John Gunther Dean, on the road to the Ba'abda Palace. Even the Soviet Embassy has faced telephone threats.

Arab embassies which have been exposed to armed aggression, like those of Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Libya, have received telephone threats and this has made most Arab countries dispense with the presence of their

ambassadors in Beirut, contenting themselves with a small number of employees headed by a charge d'affaires.

Five airplanes have been hijacked from or to Beirut to publicize the cause of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr. A plane was hijacked from Beirut to Kuwait by an invalid from Tripoli who was at his wit's end for treatment as he was poor. Four ships bearing arms come to Lebanon every month, two to eastern harbors and two to the western ones; the number rises and falls according to supply and demand. This is in addition to the weapons which come in by land, smuggled or by permit, to the Palestinian resistance from the Syrian government.

An Attempt on the American Ambassador

Why the escalation in assassinations, explosions and terror in the recent period? Does Lebanon deserve all this?

A senior Arab diplomat says that the purpose in the escalation is to change the direction of Lebanese thinking which adheres to Lebanon's independence and sovereignty and supports its legitimacy, insisting on its thinking in spite of the war, toward other formulas which will bring about the results which had been hoped for from the war but have not yet been realized. The diplomat adds that Israel is the major beneficiary of the shift in the direction of thinking from that of a united Lebanon to arrangements which it is considered will offer salvation from the state of terror the country is going through, even if it does not agree with its unificationist, legitimate tendencies. The charge of benefiting from the terror in Lebanon has not been withheld from other parties.

The senior Arab diplomat says that circles close to the American ambassador tend to accuse Lebanese elements which have acted on Israeli orders to carry out the operation to assassinate Ambassador Dean, following the statement he made on the Israeli aggression in the south. He supported Lebanon and condemned the operation to the point where his position was in principle removed from that of the Department of State in Washington. The Arab diplomat stresses that no one accused of this incident has been detained. Even if anyone has been, that has not been definitively announced, because there are types of detention which are more harmful to the detaining authority than to the detainees.

al-Qadiri from al-Ta'if

The answer to the second question appeared in a statement the acting Lebanese minister of the interior, Prof Nazim al-Qadiri, made before the conference of Arab interior ministers in the town of al-Ta'if in Saudi Arabia. He wondered about the desired role in Lebanon, stating "If the Arab security plan presupposes integration of the links in the chain of unity, there is the link of Lebanon, which has been afflicted by Arab

contradictions and clashes among Arab countries. Winds are bearing the seeds of change from Lebanon to other countries."

This statement turned the conference from a technical one, which the host country had wished for in order to avoid opening the file on Arab disputes, into a political one which began with Minister al-Qadiri's statement on the role of the Arabs in Lebanon and ended with a recommendation from the Lebanese delegation, which included Samih al-Sulh, director general of the interior, Muhammad Shuqayr, the minister's personal counsellor, and two military men, that political crimes be included in the next conference's agenda; they had not been included in the agenda for this one.

It was noted that the Tunisian minister of the interior, Driss Guiga, whose country is complaining of problems of a "Lebanese" character, was the only person to visit the Lebanese delegation. However, after Minister al-Qadiri's statement, delegation heads came in groups to the Lebanese delegation and all expressed a readiness which did not go beyond a "market place of sympathy" for Lebanon, in the phrase of the Lebanese interior minister. The head of the Libyan delegation expressed his country's readiness to help Lebanon, but he imposed the condition that the Lebanese government agree to the establishment of "air cover." Minister al-Qadiri replied that the establishment of air cover would require missile bases; the Lebanese government has the smallest share of territory among the forces present on the Lebanese stage, and therefore has nothing to give.

The conference was replete with administrative resolutions which did not lead to practical results. The Syrian delegation demanded that emphasis be laid on reviving the treaty on the extradition of criminals among Arab countries, demanding that some Arab countries extradite persons accused of crimes to Syria, but got no response. The Palestinian delegation, headed by Nani al-Hasan, put the blame for everything happening in Lebanon, especially for keeping the army from entering the south, on Israel. He asked the Arab states to stress treatment of the Palestinians as Arab subjects, lest they be sent away, as happened in some Arab countries.

The discussions in the hallways did not lead to any practical political results either. However, Lebanon, being a traditional commercial export-import center, is an import-export center for terrorism. Some of the things happening there are considered punishment for the terror it exports to all areas of the world, Arab and foreign.

Opponents and Clients

All opponents of Arab regimes are present in the Lebanese capital, or were there then left. The day after any Arab regime clashes with its opponents, you will find people telling you that some of these opponents have arrived in Beirut. Why? Beirut international airport is open to everyone, in spite of all the measures taken. That is the situation the airport experienced before the war--to a lesser degree of course. There are good will

agreements between organizations and some airport authorities to let in people these organizations designated without receiving entry permits in advance. In addition, organization vehicles which come to Beirut pass through without being inspected. On top of that, there are the illegal ports.

Right, Left and Others

All the left-wing and right-wing organizations in the world have come to Beirut, been trained, and received the facilities they want--the German Baader-Meinhof, the Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigades, the Turkish organization. It once happened that a Turkish left-wing group met a right-wing group of the same nationality on a public street. They clashed, then one of them went to complain to a major Palestinian official that since they were fighting in Turkey, how could they be training in one place? The Palestinian official replied, "Every shot fired in the world benefits me."

It also happened that two Iranian groups exchanged fire in a public street; one of them, supporting Imam Khomeyni, charged the other with being an agent of the Shah. That was before the victory of the Iranian revolution.

There are organizations from Latin America which issue publications in the Arabic language in Beirut on their activities. If one develops the habit of strolling in a specific area of Beirut he will in time observe all nationalities there, which have no job but to get in contact and coordinate. There you will find types of currencies which you will not find anywhere else in the world.

Even when an Arab regime schemes to liquidate its adversary abroad by indirect means, it will find someone in Beirut to carry out that task--voluntarily most of the time.

Thus the group which carried out the operation of taking the OPEC-state ministers hostage in Vienna started in Beirut, and there were Lebanese among them. The attempt to assassinate Shapur Bakhtiar was arranged in Beirut and a Lebanese was in charge of those who carried it out. Zuhayr 'Akashah, the Palestinian residing in Beirut, killed the Yemeni judge 'Abdallah al-Hajari in London, then hijacked a West German airplane to Mogadiscio, the capital of somalia, where he and a comrade were killed.

The Eastern as in the Western

In the eastern sections of Beirut, as in the western ones, Western foreign experts and even Israelis, may be observed, bearing Western European passports, in public places.

In the investigation made after the assassination of 'Ali Salamah (Abu Hasan), it became clear that a Lebanese organization helped carry out the

operation by supplying the group with the explosives placed inside the car which ended his life and the lives of his companions.

Some Lebanese have also been accused of facilitating the task of the group which carried out the Verdun massacre which ended the lives of the three Palestinian leaders in 1973. One of these was killed during the fighting on being thrown from the balcony of his home in the same area.

How far will the limits of this terror go? Internationally, the initiatives from Beirut are declining and may stop, in the midst of further diplomatic and political activity on the part of Palestinian leaders. In the Arab context, one can control them only from abroad; the more the intensity of the Arab disputes lets up, the more the reciprocal terror will too.

In the Lebanese context, this terror will stop only within a new political format for Lebanon which abandons all that is old and exemplary, such as the unity of the land, the people, sovereignty and legitimacy. The statement by a well informed Arab ambassador expressed the view that the people responsible for the continuing conspiracy use terror to reach their political goals. If these goals are attained, the terror will stop.

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REDEVELOPMENT COUNCIL CHIEF OUTLINES PLANNED PROJECTS

Beirut AL-BAYAN in Arabic Aug 80 pp 20, 21

/Article by Sabah Ramadan: "Muhammad 'Atallah, chairman of the Development and Reconstruction Council, Talks to AL-BAYAN"/

/Text/ The task imposed on the Council of Development and Reconstruction must be translated into a general context for the redevelopment process. Proceeding from that point, the council has set out to promulgate a framework for the reconstruction process, taking the current security and political conditions prevailing in the country into consideration.

The Redevelopment and Reconstruction Council has set out on its difficult course, relying on cooperation with ministries and general departments to perform its responsibilities for preparing plans and programs, carrying them out, handing them over and following up on them.

Its first but not last concern has been to mobilize financial resources domestically and abroad and to prepare competent executive personnel. The financial resources needed for the construction process greatly exceed what can be provided inside the country; therefore, the council has had to strive to bring declared and undeclared financing resources into actuality, and it has had to develop the ability to administer, start movement, and provide the human and material means to play the part expected of it.

Proceeding from this premise, the meeting took place with the chairman of the Development and Reconstruction Council, Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, who spoke incisively about the council's activity and the reconstruction project at this stage.

The Reconstruction Project

Dr Muhammad 'Atallah said, "In the framework of the second reconstruction plan, the council has set out the reconstruction project, which comprises the exceptional missions which must be carried out to bring Lebanon back to its natural state."

/Question/ What are these missions?

/Answer/ These missions embrace the reconstruction effort in the private and public sectors. In the private sector--especially in the sectors of agriculture, industry, tourism and others--the cost of the necessary investments has been appraised at about 12 billion pounds. The council has recommended that the government provide one-third of this, that is, 4 billion pounds, in the form of easy loans to private sector organizations. As regards the public sector (except for construction of the army, the security forces and government structures), the cost of the basic reconstruction projects has been estimated at more than 10 billion pounds.

Method of Spending

/Question/ How will the money be spent?

/Answer/ The 10 billion will be spent in the following basic areas:

Housing: 4.5 billion pounds will be spent on repairing and rebuilding destroyed houses, on aid programs to the south, and on the plan to construct new housing units for people with incomes that do not exceed 15,000 pounds per year.

Potable water: 350 million to provide water for Beirut and the provinces.

Re-equipping public schools and hospitals: the cost of that will come to about 400 million pounds.

Re-equipping the road system: total cost comes to 1 billion pounds.

Re-equipping the port of Beirut: cost of that comes to 300 million pounds.

Re-equipping Beirut international airport: its cost comes to 700 million pounds.

Re-equipping telecommunications: costs of that come to 800 million pounds.

Reconstructing the Trade Center in Beirut: the costs of this come to about 900 million pounds.

The costs of these projects in current prices have risen by 50 percent, bringing the cost of the reconstruction project in the public sector closer to 15 billion pounds.

Projects Which Have Been Carried out

/Question/ What implementation has taken place on these projects so far?

/Answer/ Work is now underway to grant easy loans for the repair and rebuilding of destroyed houses; the value of the loans taken out comes to 100 million pounds. The actual housing unit project designs have been completed, following the basic studies for it, which were completed some time ago.

The potable water project, especially for Beirut, is still wavering, for psychological reasons, and for security reasons in specific areas.

The re-equipping of public schools has been completed only in limited form, because financing is not available.

As regards the re-equipping of the road system, the Development and Reconstruction Council has presented the Council of Ministers with a recommendation to organize and finance the first stage of this project. Work has started in the project agency and it is expected that field work will begin in the next few months.

As regards projects which have almost been completed, these are:

Provision of financing to re-equip the port of Beirut from the World Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic Development. The Development and Reconstruction Council has taken direct charge of implementing the re-equipping activities.

The preliminary re-equipping processes have been completed on the airport with financing from the Kuwait Economic Development Fund.

Financing, re-equipping and upgrading of the al-Jiyyah thermal plant has taken place through a loan from the European Investment Bank.

Financing is now underway on telecommunications repair and equipment.

Finally, the plan would have started work on reconstruction of the Trade Center in mid-August 1978; however, reasons why this has faltered have been lack of security and the failure of the promised financing to arrive.

/Question/ Here it appears that security is the main condition for takeoff of the reconstruction process.

Security Obstacles

/Answer/ The Development and Reconstruction Council has begun to carry out some projects, in spite of certain security obstacles which have occurred. However, if security exists, the council will be able to make a great takeoff in implementing all the projects the country needs, and consequently its ability to mobilize financial resources will increase.

How the Reconstruction Council Has Worked

/Question/ How has the Development and Reconstruction Council worked the past 2 years?

/Answer/ During this period the council has devoted itself to mobilizing financial resources and has been concerned with relations with specialized bodies in the Arab countries, especially the development funds. It has received loans from some of them. The council has also been concerned with relations with institutions specializing in foreign aid in some friendly countries, such as the American Agency for International Development, the French Foreign Aid Institute, and others. It has managed to procure some grants and loans from them.

The council has also consolidated relations with the European Common Market group, coordinating the distribution of the loans collected to basic projects with them.

The council has concentrated on relations with the World Bank and its systems, and here I can state that these organizations' efforts have begun to be oriented toward actual participation in the reconstruction field Lebanon needs.

Arab Aid

/Question/ What about Arab aid?

/Answer/ In the light of the Tunis summit resolutions, the first signs of money have started to appear. The council has asked the Council of Ministers to adopt exceptional measures to control the spending process. The process of spending Arab funds will take place in the aid programs in the south, to which the Tunis resolutions allocated half the aid over the next 5 years. The other portion will be spent on reconstruction projects as prepared by the council.

Development?

/Question/ What about the development process, now that we have talked about reconstruction?

/Answer/ The development process will start with the building of man. What the legitimate authorities are propounding will proceed from the principles of reconciliation, to be followed immediately by continuous discussion of the lives of citizens and the life of the nation, from which they will emerge gradually, with a renewal of national objectives in all fields, and the organized mobilization of all the resources of the country will advance to reach them.

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FATE OF BEIRUT'S COMMERCIAL CENTER DEPLORED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 9-14 Sep 80 pp 34, 35

/Article by Michel Murqus: "The Center of Beirut: This Is What It Was, This Is What It Has Become"/

/Text/ "The center of Beirut has been dragged into a race of increasing speed, and one fears that it will jump into the unknown or be enveloped by a darkness which is outstripping its vitality in order to dnvelop the area. One must set forth solutions in the light of strong beacons, because if the vortex goes on and we cannot see, madness will take over."

With these words, the General Civil Regulation Department finished the conclusions of a survey on the City of Beirut as it was in 1974. The survey was made in April 1977; its conclusions were published and printed in May 1980 and are in the process of being distributed.

The survey also says "Life goes on without the center of the city of Beirut. Offices, commerce, and activities are shifting to other areas, conditionally to be independent and become acclimatized while waiting to return. However, the war is also continuing in the center of the city and at the same time centers to receive the departing activities are growing, are becoming outfitted and are growing strong."

A war in the middle of the city has caused the development that surrounds it to pass by.

But what development can the eyes of light do when the heart is dead and is passing deeper into darkness, unless the objective is to replace this heart with transplanted members?

How Was the Commercial Center?

Five thousand forty-three dwellings, 7,092 commercial establishments, 5,597 offices, 148 medical clinics, 1,368 industrial units,702 warehouses, 343 hotels and lodgings, 361 restaurants, 45 bars, 49 garages, and 143 mosques, churches, theaters, movie houses and schools--all this in an area

of 1,418,536 square meters, 14,346 of which was the area of al-Shuhada' Square. That is, this center covered 143 out of a total of 2,300 hectares which is the area of the city of greater Beirut.

If the area of the port is excluded, there remain 130 hectares, 62.5 of which are a free zone or allotted to roads. Fifty-five hectares are for buildings, 2.5 hectares for parking spaces, and 10 hectares for green spaces.

This area is broken down into 1,960 real estate properties with an average of 344.5 square meters each. Forty percent of these are less than 300 square meters in area; the big areas are for hotels and the public sector (the municipality, the palace and so forth).

The built-up areas are broken down among residences (67.55 hectares, or 33.6 percent, besides the port), offices (45.85 hectares, or 22.7 percent), commercial enterprises (26.38 hectares, or 13.1 percent), warehouses (6 percent), industry (3.4 percent), and other activities (21.2 percent), which are broken down as follows: hotels, 51 percent, parking spaces, 14 percent, bars and restaurants, 8 percent, and others, 27 percent.

1. Housing: 25,000 people in 5,043 dwellings. Of these, 9,000 have gone and the number of dwellings totals 3,195, just one third of which are less than 50 years old, that is, were built after 1925. These dwellings are 675,576 square meters in area, an average of 134 dquare meters per dwelling. The areas range from 90.42 to 156 square meters. The population density was 176 persons per hectare before the events; this has dropped to 112 persons per hectare.

2. The shops in the center of the city number 7,092 and cover an area of 263,852 square meters. The average area per shop is 37 square meters. The area varies, according to district, from 30 to 45.42 square meters. The damage rate totals 76.3 percent in the al-Najmah Square area.

These shops provided 39,000 jobs, and the population density in them comes to 600 persons per hectare by day.

3. Offices. These number 5,745 offices and medical clinics (or 5,597 offices and 148 clinics). Their area, with the clinics, is 466,563 square meters, or an average of 82 square meters per office. They provided 34,786 jobs (before April 1975) and had a density of 267 per hectare (including the port).

4. Shops and industry: These numbered 1,368 industrial units dominated by a shop character, since the labor in most of them amounted to fewer than 7 workers, for a total of 8,000 workers or wage earners. They were 69,614 square meters in area, and the average area per unit was 51 square meters.

5. Warehouses: These were 702 in number with an area of 731,422 square meters, an average of 173.66 square meters, including the port, or 104.2 square meters besides the port.

6. Hotels and lodging: These totalled 343 in the center of the city, with an area of 214,330 square meters. These hotels are of three classes:

First class, consisting of 108 lodgings with an area of 16,070 square meters, an average of 149 square meters per lodging.

Second class, one-star hotels where transients pass the night; these are 222 in number and 74,940 square meters in area. The major hotels number 13 and are, in area, 123,320 square meters an average of 9,486 square meters per hotel.

7. Restaurants number 361, covering an area of 25,729 square meters, or an average area of 73 square meters per restaurant.

8. Bars, except for hotel bars, number 45 and cover 10,445 square meters in area, or an average of 232 square meters per bar.

9. Forty-nine garages with an area of 56,680 square meters.

10. Others, 143 (mosques, churches, schools, halls, theaters, movies and so forth) with an area of 111,273 square meters.

The Departure of the Activities

This is the way the center of the city of Beirut was before April 1975. This center lost its activities and the element of its life. How have these activities been distributed, and how are they living, now that they have left, along with the human personnel?

Two hundred fifty commercial establishments and offices were in the commercial center, then left, and were presented with questionnaires. They occupy 320 locations, 186 of which are in the western section and 134 in the eastern section of Beirut.

The new branches are 269 in number; 148 of these are in the eastern section and 121 are in the western section. As for their legal status, 132 are owned and 137 are rented.

New shops number 320 and are broken down by activity and legal form as follows:

First, 48 offices, 12 of which, that is, 25 percent, have been bought or are investments (23 percent in the eastern section and 29 percent in the western section), while 36, that is, 75 percent, are rented for an average monthly rate of 550 pounds.

Second, 272 shops, 132 of which, that is, 48 percent, are owned or for investment (36 percent in the eastern section and 65 percent in the western section), and 140, that is, 52 percent, are rented for an average monthly rent of 450 pounds. Fifty percent of the new shops in the western section use kiosks (20 percent owned and 30 percent rented). In the eastern section there are no kiosks and of the shops 16 percent are owned, 60 percent are rented, and 24 percent are investments.

The daily sales in shops dropped from their previous level in the center of the city; the daily sales of shops which moved from the center of the city to the eastern section dropped from 6,700 Lebanese pounds (in the center of the town) to 1,050 Lebanese pounds in the area to which they went. The daily sales of shops which were transferred to the western section dropped from 2,800 to 800 Lebanese pounds.

This drop is different during ordinary days from special holidays. It is apparent that the multiple of the decline is as follows:

Area departed to:	Ordinary days	Special holidays
Eastern district	6.4	3.8
Western district	3.5	4.6
Both districts	5.1	4.1

The number of customers on special holidays is double the number on ordinary days anywhere. In the districts, the number of customers totals one-quarter what it was in the center of the city; on special holidays it is four times less in the eastern area, and five times less in the western area, than it was in the center.

The number of working hours in the center of the city ranged from 8 to 11, dropping 2 hours in ordinary days and 1 hour for general commerce.

The Source of Goods and Primary Materials

In the center of the city 52 percent of the goods were Lebanese by source, 3 percent Arab by source and 45 percent foreign by source.

In the new area, Lebanese goods have held their share, 52 percent, Arab goods have dropped to 1 percent, and foreign goods have risen to 47 percent. These rates vary between the eastern and western sections.

In the eastern section, the source of goods and primary materials is 45 percent Lebanese, 52 percent foreign, and 3 percent Arab. In the western section it is 62 percent Lebanese and 38 percent foreign.

As for the way the goods arrive, 33 percent of the shops in the eastern section rely on land routes, 35 percent on air routes and 32 percent on sea routes. In the western section reliance on land transport is the base

(56 percent), followed by sea transport (28 percent) and air transport (16 percent).

The mode before the departure was as follows:

A. Shops which moved to the eastern section: 35 percent land transport, 22 percent air transport, 43 percent sea transport.

B. Shops which moved to the western section: 55 percent land transport, 8 percent air transport, 37 percent sea transport.

The capital of shops which moved to the eastern area, when they had opened in the center of the city, was 338,000 Lebanese pounds. Just before they left that rose to 1,078,000 pounds, and after their departure declined to 540,000 pounds (April 1977).

The capital of shops which moved to the western section, when they had opened in the center of the city, was 316,000 pounds and on the eve of their departure had gone to 705,000 pounds. After departure, it totalled 241,000 pounds.

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CSO: 4802

NEW PLAN FOR HOLDING COMPANIES DESCRIBED

Beirut AL-BAYAN in Arabic Aug 80 pp 22-25

/Article: "Khalil Abu Hamad Talks to AL-BAYAN: One Must Prepare for the Lebanon of Tomorrow"/

/Text/ Professor Khalil Abu Hamad is known for his dynamism in his work on the legal, political and social planes. The vitality of the lawyer and diplomat arises from his faith in creative, innovative man who has been given his mind by the creator in order to polish and use it in the service of him.

In spite of all his local, Arab-wide and international preoccupations, Professor Abu Hamad found enough time to set out plans and studies which will have the effect of serving the economy of Lebanon and drawing in major Arab and foreign companies, with their massive capital.

Professor Khalil Abu Hamad recently set out a plan to establish holding companies in Lebanon containing numerous enticements over which the mouths of Arab and foreign financiers will water, attracting them to establish holding companies in Lebanon similar to those they have set up in countries which are considered paradises for tax evaders--Liechtenstein, the Bahamas, Luxemburg, Bermuda, the Caymans and so forth.

Professor Abu Hamad's plan has long been called for by businessmen in Lebanon and the Arab world who have sought refuge in the abovementioned countries to establish companies. We in AL-BAYAN have been demanding that this plan be set out since 1972, but those in charge of matters turned a deaf ear to us!

The editor in chief of AL-BAYAN met with Professor Abu Hamad in his office, which, as opposed to many law offices, was jammed with activity, and presented him with several questions on his plan, to which his answers were clear, objective and beneficial to everyone reading them.

Why the Holding Companies?

AL-BAYAN: Professor Abu Hamad, what prompted you to set out the holding company plan?

Abu Hamad: On 15 February 1978 I was reading the newspaper HERALD TRIBUNE and my attention was drawn to news about Liechtenstein, a country whose per capita income came to about $11,055 a year in 1977, that is, more than that in America, where the per capita income came to $9,320, West Germany, with $7,865, and Japan, with $4,920. I was fully aware that the reason for the high income of citizens in Liechtenstein may be ascribed to its system, which permits the establishment of holding companies and gives them great tax breaks and facilities enabling them to function in an atmosphere full of confidence and security.

At that time I wondered why Lebanon didn't imitate that small country, especially since Lebanon has advantages which do not exist there, most conspicuous being the sound, healthy banking sector, which managed to persevere during the events, function in accordance with the law and reap profits. In addition there is Lebanon's geographic situation, the availability of communications, staffs, languages, advanced modern legislation and the flexibility of the tax departments. Let me go back and state that the system of establishing holding companies requires the presence of a sound, integrated banking sector, and since that exists in Lebanon I decided to set forth the plan (the reader will find the text of it alongside this conversation /sic/), in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, since it met with a response from all officials.

AL-BAYAN: Was promulgation of the draft law the result of the impulse of a personal initiative on your part or by some official's request?

Abu Hamad: I set it forth on the impulse of serving the public interest and presented it to officials who agreed to it and endorsed it.

AL-BAYAN: There is no doubt that you have had recourse to international laws in setting out the law.

Abu Hamad: I have had recourse to laws which are applied in certain countries on companies of this type--Bermuda, Panama, the Bahamas, Liechtenstein, and Luxemburg. I have been anxious to adapt them in a manner in accordance with Lebanon's interests, since Lebanon is better than those countries for people wishing to establish holding companies, and the free economic system which Lebanon is following and whose legislation has progressed are in addition to what I already mentioned, among the benefits which all constitute a guarantee for the companies, in spite of the security situation the country is passing through.

Tax is Two-Tenths of a Percent

AL-BAYAN: In your draft have you specified tax and duty rates, or have you left those to the Ministry of Finance?

Abu Hamad: I have presented an integrated draft which stipulates a low token tax and duty rate which will encourage companies to register in Lebanon. For example, I have recommended that the tax be two-tenths of one percent on the value of the capital or 1 percent of the profits the general assembly decides to distribute--that is, the Ministry of Finance can choose which is preferable in the interests of the treasury.

Comprising All Sectors

AL-BAYAN: There is no doubt that the draft comprises all sectors--banking, insurance, trade and industry.

Abu Hamad: Yes, it comprises all sectors, and if you like I can spell out to you what a holding company is. It consists of some businessmen with a lot of money who want to invest their money in various sectors, provided that they have most of the stock, in order to manage the companies in which they participate; they establish a holding company in a country which has a special statute for holding companies, and, proceeding from the holding company, they set about participating in existing companies, factories and banks. These companies continue to pay taxes as usual, in accordance with the law, while the holding company pays a token tax, as stated previously--two-tenths of a percent. The treasury loses nothing here because the taxes owed by the existing companies are paid as usual, in addition to the token taxes for the holding companies. Refer to the text of the law.

AL-BAYAN: What is the rate in other countries?

Abu Hamad: In Luxembourg for example it is 2 percent.

Benefits of the Plan

AL-BAYAN: Did you want to attract companies to Lebanon by reducing the rate?

Abu Hamad: Without a doubt, since Lebanon will reap great profits through companies' headlong competition to register here. The benefits which will accrue from the project are numerous. Among them I might mention:

The rental of offices, since landowners will benefit, the municipalities will benefit from rental tax, the Telephone Department will benefit from the communications, accountants will benefit from the designation of oversight delegates, and the government will be assured an annual income besides the existing one. That is, the establishment of holding companies

will provide the country with a group of services and benefits, and let us not forget how many employees and workers the companies will require.

AL-BAYAN: Isn't there a fear that the holding companies will dominate the domestic ones?

Abu Hamad: There is no fear at all, because their activity will be within the scope of Lebanese Laws.

If they are to participate in a bank, for example, they will not have the right to acquire a majority of shares. If they are to participate in commercial firms, there will be nothing to stop them because the law allows foreigners to own companies.

AL-BAYAN: Do you believe, Professor Abu Hamad, that the existing situation in Lebanon will encourage the establishment of such companies?

One Must Prepare for the Lebanon of Tomorrow

Abu Hamad: In spite of everything, there are dozens of Arabs and foreigners with money who are awaiting the passage of the law so that they can come to Lebanon and establish companies here. On this occasion I can state that the Lebanese must prepare for the future of Lebanon starting today and if there is no great receptivity to registering at present, owing to the prevailing conditions, why don't we prepare for what will come after this stage? We must prepare as of today.

AL-BAYAN: We noticed, while attending an Arab conference, that many want Lebanon to have a special statute on holding companies so they may register there rather than in Bermuda or other places.

Abu Hamad: Everyone is interested in registering in Lebanon, because the structure of the system here is encouraging. Ask people who have left for Athens how they functioned and are functioning--languages are not available, communications are not easy, and the banks do not function as they do in Lebanon. I can specially mention banking secrecy, which is the pride of our banking laws and which the world envies us for.

AL-BAYAN: Doesn't the bank secrecy law need amending?

Abu Hamad: Not at all. It is exemplary, better than the Swiss law, which they have shot full of holes and no longer inspires the confidence of those dealing with Swiss banks. It is half a law now!

Bank Interest and Rules

We raised with Prof Khalil Abu Hamad, in his capacity as lawyer for the Society of Banks of Lebanon, the subject of the interest on loans which individuals receive from banks and whether it is permissible for that to

exceed 9 percent. Prof Abu Hamad's answer was that he recently set out a study of the interest issue on the basis of a request from the Society of Banks of Lebanon which concluded by asserting the following:

Debtor Loans of 9 Percent

"Lebanese law unanimously agrees on supporting the judgment which concludes that the legal interest rate should be set at 9 percent for debtors' loans.

"Agreement on an interest rate on debtors' loans, if above the legal rate, is not permissible, effective with the issuance of the Law of 24 June 1939 and the 1 March 1943 Law."

Commercial Debts

Agreement to an interest rate in excess of the legal rate, that is, 9 percent, for commercial loans is not prohibited by law and consequently is permissible: "One can rule that the interest rate agreed on in commercial matters is free of the reservations applying to the general legal provisions bearing on errors of good faith stipulated in Article 202 of the Law on Contracts and Obligations.

"The interest stipulated in collateral contracts must be free if the debt which is secured by the collateral is a commercial one."

The Three Rules

Prof Abu Hamad spells out the three legal rules which are fit to be the bases for transactions:

The first rule: No crime of usury exists for financial loans concluded for a commercial goal, whether or not they are secured by real estate collateral.

The second rule: Any interest in excess of 9 percent on non-commercial loans constitutes a crime of usury and will be punished by law.

The third rule: The only exception to the rule of not exceeding the rate of 9 percent on debtor loans arises when these debts are secured by real estate collateral.

Exceeding the Interest on the Laon Principal

As far as exceeding the interest on the loan principal goes, he states, basing himself on the judgments of jurists and definitive judiciary rulings:

"The interest may not exceed the capital."

As regards compound interest, the study says:

One may not capitalize interest every month or 3 months. An agreement which reaps this form of capitalization is void. It is not permissible to reach prior agreement on capitalizing interest either, legally, on the due dates.

Summary

Debtor loans: 1. The legal interest rate has been set at 9 percent and may not be exceeded. 2. Based on the foregoing, one may exceed that rate on loans secured by real estate collateral, provided that does not exceed a maximum of 12 percent.

Commercial loans: 1. The legal interest rate has been set at 9 percent, and one may reach agreement to exceed that rate. 2. As regards loans secured by real estate collateral, one may agree to exceed the rate of 12 percent.

Paralysis of the Courts

AL-BAYAN: What recommendations do you have for getting the Palace of Justice process moving, since justice must not remain in permanent paralysis?

Abu Hamad: The Palace of Justice issue is part of the whole, but it is possible to move the wheels of justice by special legislation. Before that, I would like to spell out the three factors which have led to paralysis in the Palace of Justice:

First, some judges have not yet sat behind the arch, though some improvement has been recorded.

Second, numerous lawyers' offices were destroyed entirely, in a manner whereby files were destroyed, burned or lost.

Third, it has been impossible to notify litigants.

Therefore if we set forth legislation which will allow notification by AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH, the newspapers, and the Lawyers' Union as regards lawyers, so that they will be compelled to give notice, as well as making it mandatory to make very stringent investigations to ensure that judges are present and verdicts are issued, especially if the files are complete, it is obvious to state that the government must provide the security measures necessary to preserve reverence for the Palace of Justice and the safety of judges and litigants.

Justice First of All

AL-BAYAN: Do you not consider it impossible to issue verdicts in the light of the prevailing security situation, since issuance of a verdict on some cases is tantamount to a risk for the judge issuing it?

Abu Hamad: When we realize that the criminal court in Beirut, under the chairmanship of Chairman Amin Nassar, issues verdicts on serious criminal cases, we find that convening other courts is natural, taking into consideration the conditions in some regions.

The Arbitration Statute

Prof Abu Hamad goes on:

"There is a heartening new phenomenon in Lebanon which has started to play its part and assert its importance, and that is the phenomenon of arbitration. In view of the importance of this matter, I have started to set forth an arbitration statute, to which draft there are numerous advantages:

First, economy in Palace of Justice fees, which are very exorbitant.

Second, freedom of persons to choose those they want to arbitrate among them.

Third, periods of time will be short, since the dispute will be terminated in a month or two, rather than 2 or 3 years.

AL-BAYAN: What countries follow this system?

Abu Hamad: All the countries in the world.

AL-BAYAN: We believe that that sort of system exists in Lebanon.

Abu Hamad: Yes, it does, in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, but there is no receptivity to it because the system is not exemplary and consequently the people have not become accustomed to it. Today, however, circumstances have made it mandatory that people submit to it, and they have become eager that it be created and that they be freed from their problems.

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BRIEFS

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS--Rabat, 8 Sep (MAP)--Aleksey Shvedov, chief of the African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Rabat Sunday evening for a working visit to Morocco. He will meet, beginning Monday, with Abderrahman Baddou, secretary of state for foreign affairs. Shvedov is accompanied by Victor Zhuravlev, section chief of the same department. [Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 8 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 4400

GULF SOLIDARITY TO FRUSTRATE U.S. PLANS URGED

GF051240 Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 2 Oct 80 p 1

[Editorial: "From Blackmail to Threats of War"]

[Text] The United States is moving in several directions in the region and encircling the Arab oil region. As these moves are being carried out by senior U.S. military officials who have visited Egypt, occupied Palestine and the Gulf region, the image of the U.S. move seems more serious than ever before, especially at a time when the region is passing through a very difficult situation that is linked to the regrettable situation between Iraq and Iran.

When the Americans intensify their political and military activities in the Arabian Gulf region, "they seek to defend their interests and the interests of the Western world, because the Gulf region is an extension of U.S. national security," according to a political statement publicized recently by President Carter. This necessarily means that U.S. intervention in the region's internal affairs has entered the phase of actual implementation after finishing the preliminary preparations.

Yesterday's statement reflects a serious insistence on intervening in the region's internal affairs by exploiting the present conflict between Iran and Iraq to serve the interests of the United States and the West. It also wants to extend international reactions to the conflict by involving the Soviet Union in this issue, which has become a difficult one, through inviting Moscow to participate in a Western action--that may be adopted under the banner of the United Nations--in order to calm the situation in the region, or in order to secure the flow of oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz and keep this strait open. At the same time, certain U.S. sources have said that the early warning devices dispatched to the region are designed to observe any foreign counter-offensive in the Gulf region, as if it were not the United States that has been threatening the Gulf's security but the Arab states overlooking the Gulf, Iran and the Soviet Union. This is not a paradox but a bitter fact indicating that the United States is willing to involve other parties in order to justify its intervention in the region.

by intervening in the region, the Americans do not intend to encircle the oil wells with antiaircraft missiles and highly sophisticated electronic instruments. This task is part of the Arab oil states' defense affairs and pertains to the right of sovereignty and self-defense in each of these states. All that the Americans seek by intervening in the internal affairs of the Gulf states is to insure the continued flow of oil to the Western consumer countries in large quantities and at very cheap prices, coupled with the continued flow of manufactured commodities, cereals and foodstuffs to Arab and Third World states at very high prices, which are sometimes extraordinarily high. They want to do this without linking these prices to inflation and the entity's complications that shake the Western economic system daily and are about to doom it to failure.

If civilization can be damaged if a war breaks out between the United States and the Soviet Union, the same kind of damage can also occur if a war breaks out and threatens to expand to regions that are considered vital by the Soviet Union and the United States. The damage to civilization may be devastating if a military conflict breaks out in the petroleum region with the palnned intervention of the superpowers aimed at dividing the world once more between them. This is actually what the United States has been unsuccessfully proposing to the Soviet Union. However, it has achieved partial success in its invitation to Western European states to establish joint naval coordination in the Arab warm waters.

To date, U.S. interests in the Gulf region have not been violated; there have been no actions that may cause the United States to worry about petroleum. The battle between OPEC and the consumer countries on linking oil prices to international economic inflation has been won by Western consumer countries. Even the humble achievements of the recent Vienna OPEC conference on reducing the oil production of some Arab states by 10 percent have been wasted due to the war between Iran and Iraq. Senior officials from oil producing countries have stated that oil production may be increased. Or, as Iraq has put it, production may be set at its maximum level. This leads to the conclusion that the U.S. pressure exercised against the Arabian Gulf region is intended, in one way or another, to reshuffle the Arab oil flow to Western consumer countries. It is also intended to influence the price of oil in these countries so they can purchase arms and weapons from the industrial consumer countries. In this way, it is manifest that the U.S. method--which is the method of Western countries--of dealing with the oil states, particularly the Gulf states, starts with blackmail, threats of war and finally economic and political blackmail.

The Gulf states have stressed that in order to prevent the United States and its allies from blackmailing the Gulf peoples and stealing their resources, the region's problems must be solved on the basis of solidarity, joint interests, avoidance of violence, constructive coordination within the framework of the Arab League Pact and the principles of Islamic solidarity and by giving the interests of the peoples of the region priority above all other interests.

If the Iranian-Iraqi conflict has exposed some defects that may be exploited by the enemies of the Gulf and the Arab nation--above all the United States and the Zionist entity--the security of the Gulf and the protection of the region's peoples can be achieved by solidarity, joint action, paying respect to the national rights and sovereignty of each state and by frustrating the plans of Carter and Brzinski, who consider the Gulf to be part of U.S. national security interests.

CSO: 4802

EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON ESCALATION OF GULF TENSION

GF051100 Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 30 Sep 80 p 16

[Editorial: "The U.S. Plan to Escalate Tension in the Gulf"]

[Text] Ever since the Iraqi-Iranian conflict developed into a crisis--which has resulted in the 9-day-old war--the UAE has been supporting every effort to stop the fighting and settle differences through dialogue, negotiations, arbitration or any other peaceful means that will safeguard each party's rights and restore amity and good neighborliness to both countries. Both are linked by mutual interests, Muslim brotherhood, affiliation with international organizations and the unity of belonging to the Gulf region, which seems by all criteria to be a most sensitive and vital spot because of its oil and strategic position.

The UAE and other Arab Gulf states' media have never desisted--even from the first day of the war--from calling sincerely and urging incessantly for an immediate halt to this fighting. But the United States, with its allies and agents in the area and because of its unconcealed regional ambitions, is trying and even planning to exploit this war to achieve these interests and ambitions. The United States and its agents know very well that the UAE has never taken and will never take a hostile stand toward either of the two fighting parties.

In spite of this, the United States is trying through lies and intrigues to pit Iran and the UAE against each other, aiming at escalating tension in the area and at expanding the circle of war, with its destruction, fire and devastation. America's objective is evident to anyone who knows its ambitions and those of the Soviet Union and their struggle to control the destinies and riches of nations. The achievement of this objective, in the logic of the superpowers--especially the United States--requires a favorable atmosphere and a reasonable justification for intervention.

There is no doubt that anyone who tries to expand the circle of war is aiming, even unconciously, at serving the interests of those who are intending to repress the peoples of the area and plunder their wealth.

As for the Gulf region, from which and through which oil supplies to the entire world flow, especially to the industrialized states led by the United States, the suitable climate for those who have ambitions in this region is to have it encircled by a state of tension and the atmosphere of war in such a way that the oil wells and passages to them--and thus the interests of the industrialized states, their factories, economies and even their very lives--become exposed to danger. In this way, the climate becomes suitable for intervention. Therefore, the United States and its allies and agents are exploiting the war between Iraq and Iran to fuel malice and weave intrigues and plots.

It is neither in the interest of Iran nor the region to escalate the crisis and expand its scope. It is in the interest of the United States and other countries that have ambitions in the whole and not part of the region.

It is in the interest of the area, especially Iran and Iraq to end this war and settle their differences peacefully. In this way, the wealth of the area remains for its people, and doors are closed in the face of the United States and its ambitions.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

NO PROPOSALS ON THREE GULF ISLANDS--Informed sources in Baghdad have asserted that Iraq has not suggested to the UAE any plans or proposals regarding the three Arab islands [Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb], and that there is no truth to reports on this matter. Iraqi Defense Minister 'Adnan Khayrallah had sais UAE officials are free to act on the islands issue in accordance with their judgment of the international situation, and that the UAE has legitimate rights in these islands. The Iraqi defense minister said his information confirms that the UAE has submitted a memorandum to the United Nations demanding that the islands be returned to UAE sovereignty. [Text] [Correspondent's dispatch from Baghdad] [GF281356 Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 27 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 4802

MZALI DISCUSSES COUNTRY'S ACHIEVEMENTS, CULTURE, FOREIGN RELATIONS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Sep 80 p 5

/"Exclusive" interview with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali--date not specified/

[Text] [Question] You recently stated in an interview given to a widely circulated daily French newspaper that Tunisia is entering a new phase. Mr Prime Minister, would you like to elaborate on the tenor and objectives of this phase?

[Answer] The independence of Tunisia was proclaimed about 25 years ago. In the history of nations, that is not a long time ago. In the history of a nation as young and as demanding as ours is, it nevertheless represents something. However, the most important is that, during this quarter of a century, dramatic changes have taken place, which have made of the Tunisian people, emerging bloodless from the long colonization period but impassioned by the epic struggle for freedom and the right "to exist," a people completely transformed, deeply transformed. It was hard work. The struggle was long. After having fought to provide the protocol of 20 March 1956 with real content, and it was merely a protocol, our struggle for development could only be difficult because it was serious. We have even faced trials, crises, upheavals. But is Tunisia worn out for all that? Some have thought so.

As for us, we sometimes had our moments of anxiety. However, we never lost the militant hope that has always been in us. We never wavered from our bourguibian determination that has always inspired the bourguibian militants that we are.

And then, thanks be to God, Bourguiba is still here. The helmsman and the wind--! If we like to reminisce, rightfully and with pride, about our accomplishments, our successes, we also know how to learn from trials, courageously recognize our mistakes, see with clarity the new phases that we must pass through to meet the aspirations of our young people, to go forward.

This is our ammunition at the outset of this new decade, of the step that we will be taking.

What target will we have? How fast will we move?

Our unit of measurement will first of all be the aspiration of the people. What do the people aspire to?

More dignity, more authenticity, more prosperity, more liberty...

Does this mean that the Tunisian people have not enjoyed freedom up to the present, or that they could not hope for prosperity, or that they had lost their dignity or their identity? Certainly not! However, they would like to attain it in its fullest. In this aspiration, the Party and the Government of President Bourguiba can only be in the foreground of the battle, at the head of the troop, as they have always been in the past.

Will you ask me for tangible evidence?

Read the papers and listen to the radio, I would answer!

[Question] You mean the openness, Mr Prime Minister, if I understand well. But from having been used in so many different contexts, the concept of openness has become far too abstract. What meaning do you give to it so that everyone, and namely the young people do not feel cheated?

[Answer] Our openness in regard to ourselves, to others and to the future has always been one of the foundations of the bourguibian ethic. The young people are not as skeptic as you seem to think. Make available to them the columns of your paper. Let them express themselves freely. You will see that they are full of hope and vitality. You will see that they are patriotic and progressive. If you are worried about what they might say about the government, that is the government's business.

There are no more political prisoners in the Tunisian prisons. The workers and the young people, all young students as well as factory workers and farmers are invited to take charge of their own destiny, to participate more efficiently in the fight against underdevelopment, to train themselves, to readapt themselves, to develop their personality, to sharpen their critical judgment in order to be protected from empty slogans, deaf to the lures of demagogy, to convince themselves that [word missing in French text] with the others, for the others in voluntary discipline.

[Question] Do you believe that the existence of opposition in Tunisia is normal? To what extent are the different leanings which exist in Tunisia affected by the effective and thorough dialog that you are advocating?

[Answer] I believe that the overwhelming majority of Tunisians, men and women, are behind Bourguiba. In reality, there are some Tunisians that are not in agreement with the Party and the Government. There are some even that claim to be organized into groups. Actually, they are party members that have broken with the Party or that the Party has excluded. If you

[illegible] what I wish, I would answer that the Party be the great [illegible] all the dynamic forces of the nation. It is the duty of our Party today to organize itself better, to work sincerely and loyally, to renew itself, to speak the right language, in order to be this unifying movement which would include an ever-increasing number of Tunisians who would agree on a common platform founded on patriotism and the national interest, who would not necessarily have the same thoughts, but rather obtain the greatest richness, from the greatest strength, from differing opinions and different sensitivities.

The debate would take place, as it has since 1934, within the Party itself and our action would then be founded on the broadest consensus possible.

If it [illegible] there remain what you might call oppositions or rather opposition[illegible] in Tunisia, what can I do? What I must remind you of, is that we are still opposed to coercion, and that we respect the free expression of opinions by all.

We wish even to integrate the Tunisians who do not always think as we do into the reflection process on national problems and projects.

[Question] What is the status of the trade union representation question?

[Answer] We have always said, and we repeat it, that it is up to the workers to decide their destiny as far as the organization of unions is concerned. And then, they should convene a congress to choose leaders that would represent them. The role of the Government and of the Party is simply to aid in the normal development of the process. You know that the Political Bureau took the initiative and proposed the institution of a commission that would represent all the trade union tendencies in preparation for this congress.

As things stand now, I do not believe that anyone would risk contradicting this thesis, by advocating for example that this or that man, or such and such a direction be imposed on the workers. I do not believe either that it would be in the interest of the workers to have this congress, that is the trade union representation problem, stalled because of a matter of persons. Let us give evidence of imagination and sacrifice at the same time, let us place ourselves in history and respond to the fervent wish of the workers. What is the fervent wish of the workers? To be able to have a trade union organization that is representative, responsible and dynamic. Individuals must know how to stand aside in light of this national imperative. Especially when they say they are patriotic.

[Question] Concerning the problems of the UGET [General Union of Tunisian students], do you think that you can overcome the reticences of the students and their divisions?

duty to recommend a course of action, because

Minister of National Education, to the Deans at the begin-

an indication of whether 7 years have allowed

If so, all the better for the University, espe-

who will then be able to participate more fully

as well as political decisions that will map out their

the pessimists of all sorts have been exposed by the

majority of students who are of sound judgment, sincere and

The role of the press in the general development of the coun-

Mr Prime Minister, what policy is the govern-

to encourage and help the mass media develop and

so as to better reflect the citizen's concerns and thus

to the development of the country?

I will tell you that it is up to the mass media themselves to

way for a harmonious evolution that would parallel the

taking place in our country. We believe moreover that information

above all that should exclude any kind of tutelage, any

of paternalism.

considers that it is necessary to encourage

evolution, to aid the various mass communication means to play

part to their fullest. That is, to be open to currents of opinion,

the concerns of their society, in one word, to harbor all voices

writings that wish to express themselves, identify themselves with

reality of the country.

there is no pressure or censorship. The journalists

wish to do so can, if not must, treat all subjects without taboo or

With respect for the law and their conscience, while avoiding inaccurate

statement this, pandering to the passions...this improvement in con-

tent is the condition sine qua non of all development.

What will be the role of the State in all this? To promote this change by

encouraging but also holding the journalist responsible. In light of this,

we are planning to propose various legislative or regulatory improvements

in order to strengthen this tendency. But there also, one must avoid dramatic and demagogic actions.

(Question) The identity of a people is measured by the originality of its culture. You believe, Mr Prime Minister, as you stated before the National Assembly, in the possibility of a mass culture for our country. What are the measures that need to be taken to implement this objective?

(Answer) Original culture? And how! Is not culture the consciousness of a people, more precisely the expression of this consciousness? Historically, we are Arab-Moslems, deeply rooted in this land of civilization, the Maghreb. All that our brains can produce, all the anxieties and hopes that we have within our hearts can only generate a certain kind of culture. A culture that is specifically national, plus the Tunisian specificity. Which means, what comes from the depths of this people, from its sufferings, its hopes, its dreams...

Where are we today? Is there a welling up of culture? I believe so. There are springtimes. But the swallows come and go, preferably during the summer. Without mentioning all the festivals that take place during this season especially. I might shock you, but I feel a certain anxiety in the face of this absence of anxiety which is the cause for dryness in all landscape. To be more lenient, I will say that there is not enough anxiety, not enough question marks.

In a country such as Tunisia, where the heavens and ocean are magnificent, history is full of trials, and young people are filled with dreams, literary and artistic works should break all barriers, large and small, flood the bookstore windows, and be of the utmost importance to young and old. What can the State do? Fling the windows wide open, encourage the blossoming of talent, and allow young people to be on stage, to be seen on television and heard on the radio.

Books and magazines are expensive, you will say. I know a little about this. And it is true for books as well as films and any other artistic creation in general. I can assure you that the cultural question will be one of our priorities.

Mass culture! And how!

It is a sacred right for the people. The government, everyone recognizes it, has done a lot in this area especially since 1961. Cultural centers with their various activities have multiplied rapidly throughout the Republic. This is only one example. But there is still a lot to be done. There is especially a need for reform. One needs to find organizers, stimulate imagination, talent and especially protect cultured men from the bureaucrats of the culture.

Wherever there is a concentration of Tunisians, in new cities, in popular towns--especially--as well as in the business world, everywhere there is

a need for a cultural infra-structure worthy of its name. An infra-structure that will be able to avoid in our cities, in our countryside, those "dead periods," this emptiness, the lack of leisure activities, the soullessness in dormitory cities, inhuman cities suited to encourage dullness, weariness and eventually delinquency.

This is why we have opted for a live, daring avant-garde cultural policy, in one word, creative.

It is in this sense that one must understand the bourguibian development plan for a mass culture that would, of course, not be reserved just for the elite, but which will not allow insignificance, mediocrity, banality. Culture must not be the poor relative. Tunisian culture should measure up to the Tunisian genius.

The Government true to itself and to the options of the country, following the directives of the Supreme Fighter, will not fail to encourage a wholesome atmosphere favorable to creation. It will continue with force and determination to help creative individuals both materially and especially morally. The administration, and in particular the local communities must strongly encourage the construction of cultural centers, and especially their judicious use.

But it is up to the creative individuals themselves, whether they are writers, artists, film directors, producers or architects, to show initiative, imagination, creativity and audacity.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, you will be undertaking in the near future an official visit to Algeria. What can the Tunisian people expect from this visit, on the bilateral level but also on the Maghrebian level?

[Answer] I am going to Algeria. I will convey the fraternal salutations of President Bourguiba and of the Tunisian people to President Benjedid and to my counterpart and brother Si Abdelghani. I am convinced that the conversations in Algiers will be followed by concrete steps towards a more profitable cooperation of continued contacts.

All that I can say for now is that there is much to be done and that the Tunisians and Algerians will accomplish it with conviction and optimism, so that there might be more than mere commercial transfers between us: an exchange of experiences, ideas, related visions, a sustained collaboration, an accomplishment that can measure up to our aspirations.

What a Tunisian can expect, what he has the right to expect from exchanges with a fraternal country is first of all a continuous improvement of fraternal relationships, a daily reinforcement of relations that can weave real bonds of neighborliness. Thus, more contacts, friendship, fraternity.

Moreover, it is normal and legitimate for Tunisians and Algerians to be individually interested in the official aspect of the relations between

the two countries. To ascertain this, one only needs to note the quality of human contacts on both sides of the border and the number of Algerians that spend their vacation in our country.

Now, frankly speaking, the citizen is interested in the economic, cultural and commercial relations that could be reexamined, to measure up to the fraternal relations that bind the two countries.

At the level of political relations, what we are hoping for, what our citizens are hoping for are more and more contacts between us, more and more working together on bilateral issues of course, but also on every aspect of the geopolitical zone that is ours.

And it seems at least desirable that there be more coordination and working together within the framework of the North-South dialog for example, in our relations with the European community, or even in the defense of the just causes in which Tunisia and Algeria believe.

Your mentioning the Maghreb was good. Tunisia, who has firmly believed in the Maghrebian ideal, has always insisted that the reinforcement of its relations with brother countries and neighbors be always done within this Maghrebian perspective, in the direction of all our aspirations for a unified Arab-Maghreb.

The Maghreb, tomorrow, could be this economic and cultural construction, this considerable potential, this force in which patriotic generations firmly believe.

The Maghreb, today, and we cannot hide it, is still somewhat covered with fog. This is a real concern for us and we can only hope that these clouds rapidly disappear. Maybe the solution to the problems that appear difficult now lies in a dialog that could have as framework the Maghreb. And we are ready if necessary to work towards such a solution.

6592
CSO: 4400

INFORMATION MINISTER REPORTS ON COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 19 Sep 80 pp 1,5

[Text] The Council of Ministers held its weekly meeting yesterday morning, Thursday, 18 September 1980, at the Government Palace in the Kasbah with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali presiding.

At the end of the meeting, Minister of Information and Culture Fouad Mebazaa made the following statement:

As proposed by the minister of information and culture, the council adopted a draft bill authorizing Tunisia to sign the Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of an armed conflict.

The aim of that international convention is to strengthen the protection of cultural property in danger of being damaged and destroyed. It stipulates in particular that in the event of an armed conflict the occupation authority must abstain from any action to directly or indirectly damage cultural property.

In 1974, Tunisia signed the international convention for the protection of the world's cultural and natural heritage.

Ratification of the UNIDO Charter

Next, the council adopted a draft bill ratifying the charter of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) signed by Tunisia's representative on 8 April 1979 in Vienna.

By virtue of this charter, the organization becomes a specialized agency of the United Nations family like UNESCO, FAO or WHO. But UNIDO is particularly important because it is the first UN specialized agency whose aim is to help establish a new international economic order by promoting and accelerating the industrialization of developing countries.

Increase Capital for the Company for the Study and Development of Sousse-Nord

Based on a report presented by the minister of national economy, the council adopted a draft bill authorizing the state to subscribe 500,000 dinars in cash to the capital growth of the Company for the Study and Development of Sousse-Nord.

The purpose of this increase of capital is to enable the said company to comply with the financing regulations in the tourist sector and to start building the second phase of the Sousse-Nord tourist complex.

The volume of investments which the company will be making in coming years amounts to 32.2 million dinars.

Next, the minister of plan and finance presented a report on the implementation of the budget and the state of the public treasury.

The report shows a growth pattern in government returns, a normal rate of operational expenses and a relatively low rate of expenditures for basic capital projects.

Commenting on that report, the prime minister noted the satisfactory state of the public treasury and the improvement of tax receipts. He recommended to step up work in projects and to complete the construction of civilian buildings and housing units on schedule to help improve the living conditions of the citizens and to create jobs.

Economic Cooperation With Arab Countries

Next, the minister of plan and finance reported on the meeting of the 29th Ordinary Session of the Arab Economic and Social Council which was recently held in Tunis.

The Pan-Arab organization examined in succession: a general outline plan for an Arab economic strategy, a proposal of a standardized agreement concerning investments of Arab capital in Arab countries and, finally, a proposal for an agreement to facilitate and develop trade exchanges between Arab countries.

The minister told the council about the contacts and talks which he had with his Arab counterparts outside the meeting and which dealt, in particular with the creation of joint financial institutions where Tunisia will be a partner of other Arab countries as is the case in the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Bank the creation of which was announced a few days ago.

The minister also told the council that a conference on Arab investments will be held in Tunis this coming 27 October.

The prime minister expressed his satisfaction at the creation of joint banks grouping Tunisia and fraternal Arab countries. He noted that these institutions will offer new possibilities of financing various Tunisian projects in the industrial, agricultural and tourist sectors. These financial facilities will lessen the burden of the state in that sphere and will bring added stimulus to the growth of the national economy.

8796
CSO: 4400

DECENTRALIZATION SEEN AS NEW STIMULUS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] Lately, the policy of industrial decentralization has been substantiated by recent decisions to relocate the administrative offices of industrial and other units in the regions where they have their production plants. This is how a company such as the Gafsa phosphate company has relocated its offices in the capital of that province.

The ground had been prepared by legislation introduced several years ago to regulate the creation of specialized agencies such as the AFI [expansion unknown], the API [expansion unknown] and the FROPRODI [expansion unknown] and the creation of the rural development program in the agricultural sphere.

The main purpose of the economic and administrative decentralization is to make every region in the country enjoy the advantages of the development action initiated several years ago but which, so far, have not been adequately apportioned on a regional level. The regional unbalance is, indeed, a reality and a matter of concern. Some parts of the country, particularly the hinterland areas (such as the frontier provinces), have yet to reach the level of development attained by the coastal regions.

It so happens that one of the objectives of the decentralization is to close the gap and reduce the disparities between the various regions of the country and this goal can only be achieved by means of an effective and general administrative decentralization. The decentralization must be carried out at the administrative level as well as at the economic level. It is by delegating greater power to the regional authorities, and by promoting the enterprises of the interior through incentives, that the production apparatus can be decentralized. Right now, the industrial plants are concentrated around the capital city and around some big coastal towns. A well-planned decentralization will ease the congestion around the capital city which attracts and monopolizes a large portion of the production apparatus. This attraction is also explained by the advantages that Tunis offers being near the ports and airports and having a developed and dense network of communications which links

Tunis to the interior. To this must be added the fact that most of the administration is concentrated in Tunis while the regions lack decentralized authorities who are capable of making the necessary decisions. In fact, it is not unusual to see local contractors having to come to Tunis to solve problems of a purely administrative nature.

This situation, now gradually becoming more exceptional, is one of the many problems curtailing the decentralization of industry. An additional problem is the fact that in some regions the network of roads has not been developed which creates many difficulties for would-be developers who are attracted by the substantial incentives offered by measures encouraging decentralization.

It is obvious that decentralization does not mean an extreme dispersion of the production apparatus. Decentralization is really necessary but it must be economically feasible. The creation of regional industrial poles, such as Gabes with its chemical industrial plants, Sousse with its electrical engineering factories, Bizerte with its refinery and steel works, and so on, are bound to stimulate the entire surrounding region through the element of attraction that it will inject into the economy of the region concerned. It is a fact that the creation of any industrial plant encourages the creation of subsidiary and subcontracting units. A certain plant, for instance, will promote the creation of a small subcontracting packaging unit or the creation of service firms (such as cleaning firms). In addition to this, there is the pulling effect of decentralization on the commercial activity of the region. This pulling effect of decentralization is important and can have a big impact on the economy of the region and, therefore, on the economy of the entire country.

As far as jobs are concerned, the decentralization will create jobs at the regional level and will contribute to reduce the volume of the rural exodus which affects not only Tunis but also other large cities in the country, cities which are constant poles of attraction for the rural population.

8796
CSO: 4400

PROTOCOLS ALLOW TUNISIA GOVERNMENT CREDITS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 19 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] The Tunisian-French Joint Commission for Economic and Financial Cooperation ended its work yesterday afternoon. The outcome of the meetings was the signing of financial protocols allowing Tunisia to receive government credits under favorable conditions and guaranteed credits (COFACE) [French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade] to a total amount of over 50 million Tunisian dinars assigned to finance investment programs in conformity with the objectives of Tunisia's development plan, such as industrial projects, aid programs, lines of credit to finance small and medium-sized businesses and to promote small and medium-sized agricultural businesses.

This last activity falls within the framework of the new guidelines in Tunisian-French cooperation agreed by the two governments in the course of talks held in Tunis during the recent visits of Minister of Foreign Trade Jean Francois Deniau and Foreign Affairs Minister Jean Francois-Poncet.

After the financial agreements were signed, Ambassador Ahmed Ben Arfa, director general for cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and chairman of the Tunisian delegation, made a speech in which he expressed satisfaction at the spirit of friendship and understanding that presides over the new guidelines in Tunisian-French cooperation which we wish to be more consistent and exemplary, he said.

Referring to the aid in food supplies, Ben Arfa noted that the 1980 quota of 24,000 tons of wheat had been delivered to Tunisia in full and he hoped that the same will happen next year.

For his part, Michel Condessus, head of the French delegation, said that the negotiations had been constructive: "It is with the same determination and in the same spirit that we are going to work towards those new guidelines in Tunisian-French cooperation," he noted.

Let us point out that the French delegation left Tunis yesterday evening.

8796
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RA'S AL-KHAYMAH RULER COMMENTS ON IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT

NC021159 Doha QNA in Arabic 1040 GMT 2 Oct 80

[Excerpts] Abu Dhabi, 2 Oct (QNA)--Shaykh Saqr ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah emirate in the UAE, has said that the discussion of the question of the three islands, which Iran is occupying, is the responsibility of the UAE and not of Ra's al-Khaymah. He stressed that any contacts taking place with Iran in this respect are the concern of the UAE.

Shaykh Saqr al-Qasimi revealed that he had contacts with Iranian religious leader Imam Aytollah Khomeyni at which he obtained his agreement on reaching an understanding concerning the three Arab Gulf islands--Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa--which Iran occupied in 1971.

These statements by Shaykh Saqr were published today in the Abu Dhabi newspaper AL-FAJR, as well as in the British newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES. He called for mutual respect among the states in the area and nonaggression as two conditions for coexistence in the Gulf area.

On his views on the present war between Iraq and Iran, he said: Our views are summed up in that Iraq is claiming its rights. Therefore, an understanding must be reached for a solution; namely, for Iraq to achieve its right in order to prevent a repetition of what happened when Iran expelled the people of Ra's al-Khaymah from Lesser Tunb, one of the three islands.

Asked whether he would assist Iraq in restoring these islands to Arab hands, Shaykh Saqr said: When the Iranian revolution broke out we hoped it would eliminate this injustice which took place during the shah's era. But, when responsibilities change hands and the responsible man strays along his course, oppression becomes harmful to both sides. We condemn and denounce this.

Asked whether he believes that the states in the area would take part in the Iraqi-Iranian war, Shaykh Saqr said that the states in the area do not want the war but they would not surrender to anyone. The states in the area desire peace, we have no one to confront. He said: Our area is the land of peace as long as its leaders called for peace. This is evident in President Saddam Husayn's call for peace while he is engaged in the war. How about those who d'd not enter the war?

CSO: 4802

EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR

GF281213 Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 24 Sep 80 P 1

[Editorial: "With Justice Against the Third Party"]

[Excerpts] Our stand in support of the Arabs in regaining every inch of their soil is unquestionable and based on principles. Our land was usurped 10 years ago, when the steel heel of the tyrannical shah trod with ostentation and pride, on our rights in the three islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb. At the same time, he deleted Shatt al-Arab from the Iraqi map. The purpose of this war must be limited right from the start by preventing the armed struggle from excedding its assigned objectives. It is a war into which we were driven by necessity to seek a remedy for an old error. Therefore, it must not be turned into a continuing epidemic.

For both the Arab and Islamic worlds, the Iranian revolution was a new victory that heralded the triumph of man's will against the gigantic powers that are aided by international aggression.

For the Arab and Muslim, its nobility was manifested in the breaking of ties between Muslim Iran and Begin's Israel, when the Palestinian flag replaced the Israeli flag, and when the 40 million Iranians replaced the 40 million Egyptians in the confrontation front after the latter were driven out of this front by force. This was God's compensation for those who were led astray by the sumbissive leadership. We remember this well. We will not forget that the atmosphere is clear for reconciliation and the solution of land disputes in view of Muslim brotherhood. But this possibility has been eliminated by the work of someone who widened the gap between the two sides and planted mines among their good intentions.

There is a third party benefitting from the events. This fact makes us more determined than ever to limit the war to regaining land usurped by the defunct regime, which was hostile to both peoples.

The United States and particularly Israel cannot conceal their joy at this struggle. They have begun to count the booty and deduct the number of victims and planes from the remaining power they have to face.

What is troubling is that the longer the war lasts, the further it strays from its assigned objectives, which must not be ignored. This action defers a more effective and grander action. Our common enemy is getting stronger through our weakness resulting from our tragic fighting.

We didn't want this war to erupt, but we knew that old accounts needed settling. We knew many parties wanted to fuel this war and are still trying to escalate and intensify it. Therefore, we must be wiser, stronger and bolder to make it a beginning, not an end, and to turn it in our favor. We must try to solve it promptly in the interest of avoding another inevitable battle.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

RATIFICATION DOCUMENT--After reviewing the Cultural agreement between the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and the People's Republic of China (PRC), dated 23 April 80, the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation between the YAR Ministry of Information and Culture and the Ministry of Culture of the PRC, dated 23 April 80, and the documents pertaining to all the constitutional procedures necessary for the approval of these documents by the Executive and the Legislative authorities according to the YAR Constitution, we have issued Republican decree No 18 of 1980 approving the aforesaid agreement and Protocol. Based on the mutual trust between the parties to this agreement, and our total conviction of the beneficial results, and the cooperation resulting from the entry into force of this agreement, we declare our approval and our final ratification of the aforesaid agreement, and our respect of all its provisions. According to the above we append our signature to this document next to the official seal of the state in witness thereof. Registered in the Presidential headquarters 22 Sep 80 Colonel Ali Abdallah Salih President of the Republic-Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. [Text] [San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 23 Sep 80 p 2]

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Oct 23 1980